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STANDING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABROAD
Evan J. Criddle†
When may states impose coercive measures such as asset freezes, trade
embargos, and investment restrictions to protect the human rights of foreign
nationals abroad?  Drawing inspiration from Hugo Grotius’s guardianship
account of humanitarian intervention, this Article offers a new theory of
states’ standing to enforce human rights abroad: under some circumstances,
international law authorizes states to impose countermeasures as fiduciary
representatives, asserting the human rights of oppressed foreign peoples for
the benefit of those peoples.  The fiduciary theory explains why all states may
use countermeasures to vindicate the human rights of foreign nationals
abroad despite the fact that they do not suffer any injury to their own inde-
pendent legal interests when another state violates the human rights of its
own people.  But the fiduciary theory also constrains foreign intervention by
prescribing a robust set of legal duties that respect the self-determination and
human rights of foreign peoples.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past several decades, states around the world have used
coercive measures such as trade embargos, asset freezes, and travel
restrictions to protect human rights abroad.  For example:
• In response to recurrent human rights abuses by Burma’s mili-
tary between 1990 and 2012, states such as Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, the United States, and members of the European
Union imposed asset freezes, visa restrictions, and limits on for-
eign investment.1
• African states levied a trade embargo and travel ban against
Burundi in 1996 after the leaders of a successful military coup
suppressed political rights by banning opposition parties.2
• In 1998, the European Union, Russia, and the United States
responded to human rights violations against ethnic Albanians
in Kosovo by imposing a trade embargo, asset freeze, travel ban,
and investment restrictions against the former Yugoslavia.3
• The Arab League, the European Union, and the United States
imposed asset freezes and trade restrictions to coerce the gov-
1 See MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. SANCTIONS ON BURMA 1–3
(2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41336.pdf (providing an overview
of the measures imposed by the United States between 1990 and 2012); Overview of Burma
Sanctions, BBC NEWS (Dec. 18, 2009, 1:21 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/
8195956.stm (providing an overview of the measures imposed by, inter alia, Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, and the United States).
2 See CHRISTIAN J. TAMS, ENFORCING OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
221–22 (2005).
3 See MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: IN-
SIGHTS FROM THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENFORCEMENT 245 (2008) (“The EU and the
United States imposed economic sanctions on Yugoslavia for violations of the human
rights of Kosovo’s Albanians, even before the Security Council mandated sanctions.”); see
also EU Imposes New Arms Sanctions on Yugoslavia, CNN (Apr. 27, 1998, 3:48 PM), http://
www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9804/27/kosovo.folos/index.html (discussing sanctions
imposed by the European Union and Russia); Norman Kempster, Yugoslavia Facing New
Sanctions over Kosovo, L.A. TIMES (June 9, 1998), http://articles.latimes.com/1998/jun/09/
news/mn-58126 (detailing sanctions imposed by the United States and European Union).
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ernment of Syria to end its violent suppression of peaceful po-
litical demonstrations during the 2011 Arab Spring.4
• In May 2014, the United States ordered asset freezes and travel
bans against individuals responsible for atrocities in South
Sudan that resulted in thousands of deaths and the displace-
ment of more than a million people.5
Although these incidents are each unique in a variety of respects,
they share a number of common features.  First, in each case, states
temporarily suspended their own legal obligations—including those
enshrined in international trade agreements, aviation agreements, in-
vestment treaties, military assistance agreements, and the customary
prohibition against foreign intervention—to coerce another state to
respect international human rights law.  Second, states intervened on
behalf of foreign nationals abroad rather than their own people.
Third, states acted pursuant to the customary law of countermea-
sures—without authorization from the U.N. Security Council—in an
effort to “restore the legal relationship” between a target state and its
people, “which ha[d] been ruptured by” human rights violations.6
Since the end of the Cold War, this paradigm for decentralized
international law enforcement, which I will refer to as “humanitarian
countermeasures,”7 has become an increasingly powerful mechanism
for addressing human rights crises around the world.  Yet the rise of
humanitarian countermeasures has not escaped controversy.  For cen-
turies, leading publicists have debated the legitimacy of decentralized
international law enforcement, and these debates have grown increas-
ingly intense over the past two decades.8  Although the United States,
members of the European Union, and a number of other states rou-
tinely employ humanitarian countermeasures to promote human
4 See Zachary Laub & Jonathan Masters, Syria’s Crisis and the Global Response, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN REL. (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/syria/syrias-crisis-global-response/
p28402 (detailing the sanctions imposed by, inter alia, the Arab League, European Union,
and the United States).
5 See Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Imposes First Sanctions in South Sudan Conflict, N.Y. TIMES
(May 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/07/world/africa/us-imposes-first-
sanctions-in-south-sudan-conflict.html (describing the sanctions ordered on two individu-
als, “one on each side of the conflict”).
6 JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE RE-
SPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT, AND COMMENTARIES ch. II, cmt. 1 (2002) (discussing the
purpose of interstate countermeasures).
7 A variety of terms have been used elsewhere to describe these measures, including
“solidarity measures,” “unilateral sanctions,” “unilateral coercive measures,” and simply
“lawful measures.” See, e.g., CRAWFORD, supra note 6, art. 48, cmt. 8; id. art. 54, cmt. 7; R
Martti Koskenniemi, Solidarity Measures: State Responsibility as a New International Order?, 72
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 337, 339 (2002) (defining “solidarity measures” to be “countermeasures
by States claiming to act in the interests of the beneficiaries of the obligation or ‘the inter-
national community as a whole’”).
8 See TAMS, supra note 2, at 48–49 (“A brief look into the classic treatises of interna- R
tional law shows that debates about standing in the general interest have a long history.”).
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rights abroad,9 developing states and international organizations such
as the U.N. General Assembly, the U.N. Human Rights Council, and
the World Health Organization have denounced many of these initia-
tives in strident terms.10
Hovering over this controversy are unanswered questions about
the legal basis for humanitarian countermeasures under public inter-
national law.  Traditionally, the international community has under-
stood countermeasures to constitute “an act of self-help by the injured
state” that is firmly rooted in customary international law.11  Yet it re-
mains unclear precisely why states may claim an “injury” that would
justify “self-help” when a target state violates the human rights of its
own nationals on its own soil.  Although a growing body of state prac-
tice bears witness to the international community’s acceptance of hu-
manitarian countermeasures as a legally valid mechanism for
protecting international human rights,12 a more robust juridical the-
ory is sorely needed to clarify the nature and scope of states’ authority
to use these measures under international law.
Over time, legal scholars have developed two juridical theories to
explain states’ standing to use humanitarian countermeasures.  Both
theories draw their inspiration from the International Court of
Justice’s (ICJ) oft-cited dictum in Barcelona Traction, which states that
“all States” may assert “a legal interest” in other states’ respect for “the
basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery
and racial discrimination.”13  The first theory, which I will call the
“state-interest theory,” posits that whenever a state violates “basic
rights of the human person,” every other state suffers an individual-
ized legal injury and has standing (jus standi) under international law
9 See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text. R
10 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 66/186, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/186 (Dec. 22, 2011)
(“Urg[ing] the international community . . . to eliminate the use of unilateral coercive eco-
nomic measures against developing countries that are not authorized by relevant organs of
the United Nations or are inconsistent with the principles of international law as set forth
in the Charter of the United Nations.”); Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on the
Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, Working Paper, The Adverse Consequences of Eco-
nomic Sanctions on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, 52nd Sess., June 21, 2000, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33, ¶¶ 58–100 [hereinafter Sub-Commission Report] (condemning
various coercive economic measures for exacerbating conditions of famine and disease in
developing countries); Human Rights Council Res. 9/4, Human Rights and Unilateral Co-
ercive Measures, 9th Sess., A/HRC/RES/9/4, ¶ 9 (Sept. 17, 2008) (rejecting “all attempts
to introduce unilateral coercive measures” as contrary to international law).
11 See Reps. of Int’l Arbitral Awards, Responsabilite´ de l’Allemagne a` raison des dom-
mages cause´s dans les colonies portugaises du sud de l’Afrique (sentence sur le principe de
la responsabilite´), (Portugal contre Allemagne), Lausanne, July 31, 1928, reprinted in 2
RECUEIL DES SENTENCES ARBITRALES 1026 (translated from the French and German by the
author from “un acte de propre justice (Selbsthilfehandlung) de l’E´tat le´se´”).
12 See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text. R
13 Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 33–34
(Feb. 5).
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to seek appropriate remedies through interstate countermeasures.14
A second theory, which I will call the “community-interest theory,”
conceives of international human rights as legal obligations that run
vertically from states to the international community as a whole.15  Ac-
cording to the community-interest theory, states that impose humani-
tarian countermeasures act as deputized agents of the international
community to enforce the community’s collective interests in human
rights observance.
Unfortunately, neither the state-interest theory nor the commu-
nity-interest theory offers a satisfying justification for humanitarian
countermeasures.  As I will explain in Part I, both theories rest upon
dubious accounts of the juridical structure of international human
rights.16  International human rights obligations are best understood
not as contracts that confer independent legal entitlements on states
but rather as nonreciprocal commitments that constitute legally bind-
ing undertakings for the benefit of human rights holders.  Because
human rights are designed to address the particular vulnerabilities
that arise within the institutional relationship between states and per-
sons subject to their power,17 they vest legal entitlements in human
beings, not other states individually or collectively.  Contrary to the
ICJ’s assertions in Barcelona Traction,18 therefore, the better view is that
intervening states lack a primary legal interest of their own that would
confer standing to impose countermeasures in response to human
rights abuse abroad.
In Part II, I develop an alternative theory of state standing to en-
force the human rights of foreign nationals abroad.  The theory I pro-
pose trades on the insight that human beings—not states or the
international community as a whole—are the designated “benefi-
ciaries” of state human rights commitments.19  Drawing upon Hugo
Grotius’s guardianship theory of humanitarian intervention,20 I argue
that under some circumstances customary international law autho-
rizes states to employ countermeasures as fiduciary representatives for
foreign peoples.  Rather than assert their own legal interests, states
derive their standing to contest human rights violations abroad from
the legal injuries that foreign nationals suffer at the hands of their
14 See infra Part I.D.1.
15 See infra Part I.D.2.
16 I use the term “juridical” throughout this Article to capture the formal legal charac-
ter, definition, or internal structure of certain norms and relationships.
17 See generally Evan Fox-Decent & Evan J. Criddle, The Fiduciary Constitution of Human
Rights, 15 LEGAL THEORY 301, 302 (2009) (developing a theory of human rights that
reframes them “as legal entitlements grounded in the state-subject fiduciary relationship”).
18 Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. 3.
19 CRAWFORD, supra note 6, at 1, 43. R
20 See 2 HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE ch. XXV, pt. I (A.C. Campbell
trans., 2001) (1625).
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own state.  States’ authority to impose humanitarian countermeasures
under contemporary international law is akin to the authority that
guardians, agents, trustees, corporate directors, doctors, and attorneys
exercise in municipal private law: it is held and exercised in a fiduci-
ary capacity for the exclusive benefit of a foreign people.  This Article
suggests, therefore, that the international community should
decouple humanitarian countermeasures from dubious notions of
“state interests” and “collective interests,” and recognize instead that
states’ standing to protect the human rights of foreign nationals
abroad rests ultimately upon the legally protected interests of human
rights holders.
The fiduciary theory developed in this Article has several advan-
tages over previous theories of human rights as “obligations erga
omnes.”  First, unlike previous accounts of humanitarian countermea-
sures, the fiduciary theory explains how the nonreciprocal character
of international human rights commitments can be reconciled with
the reciprocal structure of interstate countermeasures.  Second, the
fiduciary theory takes seriously the agency problems that arise when-
ever states undertake to act in the interest of foreign peoples, and it
offers constructive solutions for addressing these problems.  Third,
the fiduciary theory clarifies the scope of states’ authority to use hu-
manitarian countermeasures: states have standing to enforce the
human rights of foreign nationals abroad only when the fiduciary rela-
tionship between another state and its people has been incontrovert-
ibly compromised—either because the other state has violated
peremptory norms of general international law or because an authori-
tative international body has determined that the state has trans-
gressed its nonperemptory human rights obligations.  Fourth, in
contrast to previous theories of humanitarian countermeasures, which
are coldly indifferent to the actual desires of human rights holders,
the fiduciary theory honors the principle of self-determination by
prohibiting states from treating human rights victims as mere passive
objects of state concern.  Under the fiduciary theory, states must re-
spect the dignity and autonomy of their designated beneficiaries by
consulting with and honoring the legitimate preferences of foreign
nationals whose human rights they seek to protect.  In each of these
respects, the fiduciary theory corrects distortions introduced by
Barcelona Traction’s misguided suggestion that all states may claim an
independent legal interest in other states’ human rights compliance.
By illuminating the juridical structure of humanitarian counter-
measures, the fiduciary theory explains why powerful states such as the
United States and members of the European Union have standing to
enforce the human rights of foreign nationals abroad.  But the theory
does not merely offer a legal justification for foreign intervention; it
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also furnishes a rich body of legal principles that developing states
and international organizations may use to contest humanitarian
countermeasures that are insufficiently attentive to the legitimate in-
terests and desires of human rights holders.  The fiduciary theory thus
places the developing practice of humanitarian countermeasures on a
more firm legal footing, while also clarifying the limits of states’ coer-
cive authority.
I
DEBATING HUMANITARIAN COUNTERMEASURES
Although international law enforcement today takes a variety of
forms, the international system has always relied heavily upon decen-
tralized peer enforcement to guarantee respect for international
law.21  This Article focuses on one important subset of state peer en-
forcement: nonforcible measures such as trade embargos, asset
freezes, investment restrictions, and travel bans.  Although such mea-
sures are often loosely described as “sanctions” in the political arena
and the media, international law does not permit states to use these
measures for punitive purposes without Security Council authoriza-
tion.22  Instead, decentralized coercive measures are best understood
as “countermeasures”: acts “of non-compliance, by a State, with its ob-
ligations owed to another State, decided upon in response to a prior
breach of international law by that other State and aimed at inducing
it to respect its obligations.”23  As the International Law Commission
(ILC) recognized in its Articles on the Responsibility of States for Interna-
tionally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries (Articles on State Responsibility),
customary international law permits states to impose countermeasures
under a variety of circumstances as a “self-help” mechanism for coerc-
21 See Jutta Brunne´e, Enforcement Mechanisms in International Law and International Envi-
ronmental Law, in ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS
1, 4 (Ulrich Beyerlin et al. eds., 2006) (acknowledging this historical tradition and recog-
nizing that “contemporary international law is still state-centered in fundamental re-
spects”); see also Torsten Stein, Decentralized International Law Enforcement: The Changing Role
of the State as Law Enforcement Agent, in ALLOCATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY IN THE
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 107, 107–26 (Jost Delbru¨ck et al. eds., 1994) (describing the United
Nations’ deference to its member states in enforcing international law).
22 See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
23 TAMS, supra note 2, at 19–20; see also Gabcˇı´kovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), R
1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶¶ 82–87 (Sept. 25) (discussing the lawfulness of a countermeasure in re-
sponse to an internationally wrongful act); Air Services Agreement (Fr. v. U.S.), 18 R.I.A.A.
416, ¶ 83 (1978) (discussing and applying the customary law of countermeasures); James
Crawford, The Relationship Between Sanctions and Countermeasures, in UNITED NATIONS SANC-
TIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2001) (clarifying the notion
of a “sanction” in international law and qualifying that the Security Council’s powers in the
U.N. Charter are described as responses to threats or breaches of the peace, not to interna-
tionally wrongful acts).
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ing other states to comply with international law.24  What remains un-
clear is whether, or to what extent, states may use countermeasures
not as a tool for “self-help” but rather to compel an oppressive state to
respect the human rights of its own citizens.
This Part briefly chronicles the international community’s past
efforts to clarify when, if ever, states may use countermeasures to pro-
tect the human rights of foreign nationals abroad.  The story re-
counted here has roots in Enlightenment-era debates over
humanitarian military intervention, with principles of natural right
and sovereign equality playing key roles.  By the end of the twentieth
century, however, the focus of these debates had shifted as legal schol-
ars sought to make sense of the ICJ’s assertion in Barcelona Traction
that at least some human rights norms qualify as “obligations erga
omnes.”  Contemporary legal scholars continue to vigorously debate
whether, and under what circumstances, states may assert standing to
employ humanitarian countermeasures.25  Yet for all of the attention
that legal scholars have lavished upon these issues, the international
community has made remarkably little progress in clarifying the metes
and bounds of state authority to use humanitarian countermeasures.
A. The Road to South West Africa
The idea that states may come to the aid of oppressed foreign
peoples can be traced back to the dawn of international law.  Writing
in the early seventeenth century, Hugo Grotius defended the view that
all states were bound by natural law obligations that extended be-
tween all states.  According to Grotius, states could compel their peers
to comply with natural law, irrespective of where and against whom
violations might occur.26  This enforcement authority did not derive
from any legal capacity associated with state sovereignty per se, but
24 See Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 61st Sess., May 4–June 5, July 6–Aug. 7, 2009, art.
22, U.N. Doc. A/64/10 (2009); CRAWFORD, supra note 6, pt. 3, ch. II, cmt. 2 & arts. 49–54. R
In the seminal 1978 Air Services Agreement, for example, an arbitral tribunal concluded that
the United States did not violate international law when it cancelled Air France’s Paris–Los
Angeles route in response to France’s prior refusal to permit Pan-American Airlines to use
a smaller aircraft (“change of gauge”) for its London–Paris flight. See Air Services Agreement,
18 R.I.A.A. 416.  The tribunal questioned whether the United States’ action was facially
“contrary to international law” and even if so, whether this step was nonetheless “justified”
as a proportional response to France’s prior violation of its treaty obligations to the United
States. Id. ¶ 84.  It concluded that under the circumstances, the measures were justified.
Id. ¶ 98.
25 See infra Part I.D–E.
26 See HARRY D. GOULD, THE LEGACY OF PUNISHMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (2010)
(“Borrowing heavily from classical Roman jurisprudence, Hugo Grotius asserted that any
violation of Natural Law entailed a right to punish.”); TAMS, supra note 2, at 48–49 (identi- R
fying Grotius’s claim that kings have the right to punish for injuries against natural law,
even if the alleged act was not committed against themselves) (citing 2 GROTIUS, supra note
20, ch. XX). R
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rather from a natural right held equally by all members of interna-
tional society to ensure that grave violations of the law of nature did
not go uncorrected.27  Core features of Grotius’s account would resur-
face later in John Locke’s Second Treatise on Civil Government,28 as well
as the writings of influential eighteenth- and nineteenth-century pub-
licists such as Cornelius van Bynkershoek, Johann Caspar Bluntschli,
and August Wilhelm Heffter.29  Although these scholars did not all
subscribe to Grotius’s natural law theory, they agreed that some inter-
national obligations ran between all states, such that all states could
enforce these obligations—irrespective of whether they or their na-
tionals had suffered a direct injury.
Other publicists endeavored to narrow the scope of international
peer enforcement.  Samuel Pufendorf and Emerich de Vattel argued
that punishment was permissible only within a hierarchical relation-
ship between subject and sovereign.30  International law, on the other
hand, was built on an entirely different premise: the formal legal
equality of sovereign states.31  According to these publicists, one impli-
cation of the principle of sovereign equality was that states could claim
only limited rights of intervention: the right to retaliate in response to
an injury to themselves or their own nationals (a form of self-defense)
and the right to respond to pleas for assistance from foreign peoples
to address claims that “they themselves can rightfully advance, for tak-
ing up arms to protect themselves against the barbarous savagery of
their superiors.”32  Other publicists categorically rejected decentral-
27 See 2 GROTIUS, supra note 20, ch. XX; see also GOULD, supra note 26, at 18–21 (ob- R
serving that under Grotius’s conception of international legal order, natural law required
that: “Evil deeds must be corrected”). See generally Benjamin Straumann, The Right to Punish
as a Just Cause of War in Hugo Grotius’ Natural Law, 2 STUD. HIST. ETHICS 5 (2006) (discuss-
ing the various natural rights postulated by Grotius).
28 See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT bk. 2, ch. II, § 8 (C.B.
Macpherson ed., 1980) (1690) (arguing that an “offender” against natural law works “a
trespass against the whole species,” so that every person—and, by implication, every state—
“hath a right to punish the offender, and be executioner of the law of nature” (emphasis
omitted)).
29 See TAMS, supra note 2, at 48–49 (discussing the contributions of Bynkershoek, R
Bluntschli, and Heffter, among others).
30 See RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM GROTIUS TO KANT 158–59 (1999) (discussing Pufendorf’s view
that punishment could only be administered by “someone who had agreed political au-
thority over other men”); 2 EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS ch. IV,
§ 55 (Joseph Chitty trans., 1867) (1758) (“It does not, then, belong to any foreign power to
take cognisance of the administration of that sovereign, to set himself up for a judge of his
conduct, and to oblige him to alter it.”).
31 See TUCK, supra note 30, at 158–59; VATTEL, supra note 30, § 55.
32 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO bk. VIII, ch. 6,
§ 14 (C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., 1934) (1688); see also VATTEL, supra note 30, R
ch. IV, § 56 (arguing that any foreign state can take up the right of oppressed peoples
wronged by their own state).
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ized enforcement of states’ humanitarian obligations.  For example,
Christian Wolff argued that only the international community as a
whole, operating as a collective superstate (civitas maxima), could
claim authority to enforce international law against states.33  In Wolff’s
view, “the decision does not rest with foreign nations as to matters
arising between subjects and ruler of any state, inasmuch as they
ought not to intrude themselves in the affairs of others.”34  Concerns
about sovereign equality prompted many later scholars such as Robert
Phillimore and August von Bulmerincq to reject the idea that interna-
tional law would permit states to use coercive measures to protect for-
eign nationals abroad.35
By the mid-twentieth century, this restrictivist tradition had
gained the upper hand.  The United Nations Charter, which affirmed
“faith in fundamental human rights,”36 simultaneously enshrined the
prohibition against intervention as a foundational principle of inter-
national law.37  During the same period when states were putting the
finishing touches on the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), they also took pains to condemn all
forms of foreign intervention.  In declarations devoted to “interven-
tion”38 and principles of “friendly relations,”39 the General Assembly
stressed that “[n]o State has the right to intervene, directly or indi-
33 See 2 CHRISTIAN WOLFF, JUS GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM §§ 13,
16, 258, 1011 (Joseph H. Drake trans., 1934) (1749) (objecting to the decentralized nature
of individual state enforcement).
34 Id. § 1011.
35 See 1 ROBERT PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW 320 (1854)
(“Intervention, urged on behalf of the general interests of humanity, has been frequently
put forward . . . .  [B]ut as a substantive and solitary justification of Intervention in the
affairs of another country, it can scarcely be admitted into the code of International
Law . . . .”); TAMS, supra note 2, at 49 (commenting that “Phillimore and von Bulmerincq R
warned against intervention in the name of a greater good”); August von Bulmerincq, Die
Staatsstreitigkeiten und ihre Entscheidung ohne Krieg, in HANDBUCH DES VO¨LKERRECHTS 84–85
(1889) (suggesting that if use of reprisals was expanded to third states, this would allow a
“bellum omnium contra omnes”).
36 U.N. Charter pmbl.
37 See id. art. 2(7) (exempting the Security Council’s “enforcement measures under
Chapter VII” from the prohibition against intervention but cautioning that states should
not construe other provisions to abrogate this customary norm).
38 See Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of
States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131 (XX),
¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/20/2131 (Dec. 21, 1965) [hereinafter Declaration on Intervention];
see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 101–03, ¶¶ 191–92, 202–04 (June 27) (characterizing this principle as customary
international law).
39 See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Friendly Relations
Declaration].
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rectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of
any other State.”40  Regional agreements in Africa, the Americas, and
Europe likewise condemned foreign “intervention” in the broadest
possible terms.41  Although these prohibitions against “intervention”
and “interference” were subject to conflicting interpretations, many
states clearly accepted the idea that international law would not per-
mit states to intercede unilaterally in the domestic affairs of their
peers for any reason—not even to safeguard human rights.42
B. The South West Africa Judgment
In 1962, and again in 1966, the ICJ weighed in on these matters
in the South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa and Liberia v.
South Africa).43  Ethiopia and Liberia had instituted proceedings
against South Africa, arguing that South Africa had violated its obliga-
tions under the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Mandate
for South West Africa by imposing apartheid upon the people of
South West Africa (present-day Namibia).44  Before the court could
reach the merits of these claims, however, it had to address South
Africa’s preliminary objection that Ethiopia and Liberia lacked stand-
ing because “no material interests of the Governments of Ethiopia
and/or Liberia or of their nationals [were] involved therein or af-
40 Declaration on Intervention, supra note 38, ¶ 1; see also id. ¶ 2 (“No State may use R
or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce an-
other State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign
rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind.”); Friendly Relations Declaration, supra
note 39, pmbl. (declaring “that States shall refrain in their international relations from the R
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
State”).
41 See Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act (Helsinki Ac-
cords), princ. VI, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 ILM 1292 (discussing the principles of “Non-Interven-
tion in Internal Affairs”: “The participating States will refrain from any intervention, direct
or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the
domestic jurisdiction of another participating State, regardless of their mutual relations”);
Charter of the Organization of African Unity art. III, May 25, 1963, 2 ILM 766, 767–68
(“The Member States, in pursuit of the purposes stated in Article II, solemnly affirm and
declare their adherence to the following principles: . . . non-interference in the internal
affairs of States.”); Charter of the Organization of American States art. 19, Apr. 30, 1948, 2
U.S.T. 2394 (“No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly,
for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.  The forego-
ing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or
attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic, and
cultural elements.”).
42 But see Lori Fisler Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible
Influence over Domestic Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 5–10 (1989) (suggesting that certain
political activities are not prohibited by the nonintervention norms).
43 See South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. 319,
377–79 (Dec. 21); South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Judgment, 1966 I.C.J.
6, 28–31 ¶¶ 33–36, 34–36 ¶¶ 49–54 (July 18).
44 See South West Africa, 1962 I.C.J. at 322–24 (quoting the party submissions of
Ethiopia and Liberia).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-2\CRN203.txt unknown Seq: 12 12-JAN-15 14:44
280 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:269
fected thereby.”45  The court dismissed this objection in its initial deci-
sion on the preliminary objections, holding that the case could
proceed to the merits because the mandate was “an institution in
which all the Member States are interested as such.”46  Several judges
dissented, including the court’s president, Bohdan Winiarski.  Judge
Winiarski argued that allowing states to initiate proceedings as an “ac-
tio popularis” for the international community as a whole “would have
been such a novelty in international relations, going far beyond the
novelty of the Mandates system itself in its implications, that, if the
drafters of these instruments had all agreed on the self-imposition of
such a responsibility, they would not have failed to say so explicitly.”47
When the ICJ revisited the South West Africa Cases four years later,
it reversed course and embraced Judge Winiarski’s approach, holding
by the narrowest of margins that neither Ethiopia nor Liberia had
standing to challenge apartheid in South West Africa.48  The court
noted that the Covenant of the League of Nations and the mandate
agreement entrusted authority to South Africa as “agent[ ]” or “trus-
tee[ ]” for the League collectively, not member-states individually.49
While the League had standing to enforce the mandate through its
various organs, the Covenant and mandate agreement reflected “no
similar recognition of any right as being additionally and indepen-
dently vested in any other entity, such as a State, or as existing outside
or independently of the League as an institution.”50  In particular, the
court discerned in the Covenant no “right for every member of the
League separately and individually to require from the mandatories
the due performance of their mandates, or creating a liability for each
mandatory to be answerable to them individually.”51  Although the
court resisted the view that a state must always establish “prejudice of a
material kind” to claim a legal interest in the observance of interna-
tional law, it stressed that “such rights or interests, in order to exist,
must be clearly vested in those who claim them, by some text or instru-
45 Id. at 326–27 (quoting the party submissions of South Africa).
46 Id. at 332, 343–44; see also id. at 425–26 (Jessup, J., separate opinion) (asserting a
general interest in enforcing observance of the law); International Status of South-West
Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 128, 158 (July 11) (“Every State which was a Member
of the League at the time of its dissolution still has a legal interest in the proper exercise of
the Mandate.”).
47 South West Africa, 1962 I.C.J. at 452–53 (Winiarski, C.J., dissenting).
48 The court divided evenly, with the president casting the decisive vote against the
claims of Ethiopia and Liberia. South West Africa, 1966 I.C.J. at 51 ¶ 100.
49 Id. at 24 ¶ 20.
50 Id. at 24 ¶ 21.
51 Id. at 24 ¶ 24. But see id. at 373 (Jessup, J., dissenting) (“States may have a general
interest—cognizable in the International Court—in the maintenance of an international
regime adopted for the common benefit of the international society.”).
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ment, or rule of law.”52  Because the court concluded that Ethiopia
and Liberia could not demonstrate any such interest in South Africa’s
treatment of the people of South West Africa, the states lacked stand-
ing to seek relief from the ICJ.53
Lest its decision be construed narrowly as addressing only the
Mandate for South West Africa, the court went on to reject the idea
that Ethiopia and Liberia might have standing based upon the “hu-
manitarian” character of South Africa’s obligations.54  The court
noted that “[h]umanitarian considerations may constitute the inspira-
tional basis for rules of law,” but they “do not . . . in themselves
amount to rules of law.  All states are interested—have an interest—in
such matters.  But the existence of an ‘interest’ does not of itself entail
that this interest is specifically juridical in character.”55  Any effort to
broaden state standing to protect the human rights of foreign nation-
als abroad would constitute “an essentially legislative task, in the ser-
vice of political ends the promotion of which, however desirable in
itself, lies outside the function of a court-of-law.”56  Moreover, al-
though the court observed that some municipal legal systems
recognize “an ‘actio popularis,’ or right resident in any member of a
community to take legal action in vindication of a public interest,” it
found that such a right “is not known to international law as it stands
at present” and would not qualify as a “general principle of law” under
article 38 of the ICJ Statute.57  The court thus concluded that no
treaty, custom, or general principle of law conferred standing on
other states to challenge South Africa’s racially discriminatory policies
in South West Africa.58
C. The Barcelona Traction Dictum
A few years later, the ICJ seized an opportunity to provide further
guidance in the Barcelona Traction Case.59  The case involved a dispute
between Spain and the Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Company,
Ltd., a holding company headquartered and incorporated in Ca-
52 Id. at 32 ¶ 44.  The court noted in passing the parties’ assertion that “the provisions
of certain treaties and other international instruments of a humanitarian character” au-
thorized state standing even without prejudice to “their own material interests.” Id.
53 Id. at 32–33 ¶ 44 (“The Court simply holds that such rights or interests, in order to
exist, must be clearly vested in those who claim them, by some text or instrument, or rule
of law;—and that in the present case, none were ever vested in individual members of the
League under any of the relevant instruments, or as a constituent part of the mandates
system as a whole, or otherwise.”).
54 Id. at 34 ¶ 49.
55 Id. at 34 ¶ 50.
56 Id. at 36 ¶ 57.
57 Id. at 47 ¶ 88.
58 Id. at 35 ¶ 54, 51 ¶ 99.
59 Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5).
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nada.60  Belgium sought reparations from Spain for the company’s
shareholders, many of whom were allegedly Belgian nationals.61
Belgium asserted that Spain had violated international law by, inter
alia, preventing the company from servicing its debt obligations.62
The ICJ ultimately dismissed the case, holding that Belgium
lacked standing to pursue reparations for injuries to a Canadian cor-
poration.63  The court explained that before a state could enforce a
right to performance of an obligation under the law of diplomatic
protection, it “must first establish its right to do so,” taking into ac-
count two basic “suppositions: ‘The first is that the defendant State
has broken an obligation towards the national State in respect of its
nationals.  The second is that only the party to whom an international
obligation is due can bring a claim in respect of its breach.’”64
Belgium was unable to satisfy the first criterion, the court held, be-
cause Spain owed obligations to the Canadian company, not to its
shareholders per se: “Not a mere interest affected, but solely a right
infringed,” triggers international “responsibility,” the court rea-
soned.65  Since Spain had not infringed any right of Barcelona Trac-
tion’s shareholders, Belgium lacked standing to challenge Spain’s
allegedly unlawful conduct.66
This analysis was sufficient to dispose of Belgium’s claims against
Spain.  In the course of its judgment, however, the ICJ ventured be-
yond the field of diplomatic protection to reflect briefly on a question
outside the scope of the instant dispute: whether states owe obliga-
tions “toward the international community as a whole.”67  The court
answered this question in the affirmative.  “By their very nature,” the
court reasoned, some international obligations “are the concern of all
States.  In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can
be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obliga-
60 Id. at 7.
61 Id. at 12.
62 Id. at 3, 8–11 ¶¶ 10–24.
63 Id. at 50 ¶ 101.
64 Id. at 32 ¶ 35 (quoting Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United
Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 181–82 (Apr. 11)); see also Panevezys-Saldutiskis
Railway (Est. v. Lith.), 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 76, at 16 (Feb. 28) (“[I]t is the bond of
nationality between the State and the individual which alone confers upon the State the
right of diplomatic protection . . . .”); EDWIN M. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION
OF CITIZENS ABROAD OR THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 352 (1915) (“[T]he state in
prosecuting the offense committed against its citizen is presumed to avenge and seek com-
pensation for the injury to its national welfare and dignity, an injury quite independent of
that sustained by its citizen.”).
65 Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 36 ¶ 46.
66 Id. at 47 ¶¶ 87–88.
67 Id. at 32 ¶ 33.
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tions erga omnes.”68  The court proceeded to identify some interna-
tional norms that would qualify as obligations erga omnes:
Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary interna-
tional law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of geno-
cide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic
rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and
racial discrimination.  Some of the corresponding rights of protec-
tion have entered into the body of general international law; others
are conferred by international instruments of a universal or quasi-
universal character.69
By taking pains to single out “racial discrimination” as an “obligation
erga omnes,” the ICJ pointedly repudiated its narrow approach to stand-
ing in the South West Africa Cases.  Henceforth, the court suggested, all
states could claim a genuine legal interest in universal respect for “the
basic rights of the human person.”70
Although Barcelona Traction focused primarily on state standing to
initiate judicial proceedings, the ICJ’s controversial dictum on “obliga-
tions erga omnes” had groundbreaking implications for the law of coun-
termeasures.  In the years immediately preceding Barcelona Traction,
few publicists believed that international law would permit a state to
impose countermeasures without demonstrating harm to its own na-
tionals.71 Barcelona Traction upended this conventional wisdom; if all
states could assert a legal interest in universal respect for “basic rights
of the human person,” as Barcelona Traction suggested, then it would
seem to follow that states could also claim a legal injury justifying
countermeasures whenever any state violated the “basic rights” of any
individuals anywhere in the world.72  By characterizing norms such as
the prohibitions against genocide, slavery, and racial discrimination as
obligations erga omnes,73 Barcelona Traction appeared to open the door
68 Id. (emphasis added).
69 Id. at 32 ¶ 34 (citation omitted).
70 See id.  Although Barcelona Traction liberalized state standing for “obligations erga
omnes,” the ICJ concluded that leading human rights conventions such as the ICCPR and
the ICESCR do not authorize states to initiate proceedings in an international court.  Ac-
cording to the ICJ, international human rights conventions “do not confer on States the
capacity to protect the victims of infringements of such rights irrespective of their national-
ity.” See id. at 47 ¶ 91. But see, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination pt. II, art. 11, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. IX, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].  The court suggested, therefore, that
states must seek redress at “the regional level,” where instruments such as the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) allow states to bring complaints “irrespective of the
nationality of the victim.” Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 47 ¶ 91.
71 See TAMS, supra note 2, at 94 (“[I]t was a matter of controversy whether States, prior R
to the Barcelona Traction case, in the absence of individual injury, could enforce basic hu-
manitarian standards.”).
72 Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 32 ¶ 34.
73 Id. at 32 ¶¶ 33–34.
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wide for decentralized state enforcement of international human
rights.
D. Two Theories of Humanitarian Countermeasures
Before Barcelona Traction could be put into practice successfully,
however, further effort was needed to explain precisely why, and
under what circumstances, states could claim a legal injury when an-
other state commits human rights violations abroad.  Although the ICJ
had clearly embraced the idea that some international obligations
would support universal state standing, its brief and somewhat con-
clusory dictum was amenable to conflicting interpretations.  In the
wake of Barcelona Traction, some scholars have argued that all states
may claim an individualized legal interest in global human rights com-
pliance, while others have argued that states may enforce the human
rights of foreign nationals abroad only as representatives of the inter-
national community as a whole.  Although both of these theories re-
flect plausible interpretations of Barcelona Traction’s enigmatic dictum,
neither provides an entirely satisfying account of the legal basis and
permissible scope of humanitarian countermeasures.
1. The State-Interest Theory
Following Barcelona Traction, some scholars have accepted Barce-
lona Traction’s suggestion that “all States can be held to have a legal
interest in” protecting “the basic rights of the human person.”74
These scholars contend that states covenant with one another to re-
spect, protect, and fulfill human rights, with the consequence that
every state may claim a legal interest in other states’ compliance with
their shared obligations.  Whenever any state violates its human rights
obligations, the theory goes, other states that have made the same
commitments may claim a legal injury and use countermeasures as a
form of “self-help” to vindicate their own individualized interest in
74 Id.; see, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 470 (7th ed.
2008) (“States may have a legal interest in vindicating a principle of international law, even
though they have, in the given case, suffered no material prejudice . . . .” (quoting South
West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. 6, 32 ¶ 44 (July 18));
Oscar Schachter, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: GENERAL COURSE IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 182 (offprt. 1982) (noting that “all States have a legal interest in the
observance of some fundamental norms of international law and that infringements of
such norms are violations erga omnes”); James R. Crawford, Responsibility to the International
Community as a Whole, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUDS. 303, 319 (2001) (“[A]ny State is
injured by a breach of human rights if it is a party to the human rights standard in ques-
tion.”); Giorgio Gaja, States Having an Interest in Compliance with the Obligation Breached, in
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 957, 957 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2010)
(arguing that individual state interests are “implicit in the indication that ‘the obligation
breached is owed to the international community as a whole’” (quoting Barcelona Traction,
1970 I.C.J. at 32 ¶ 33)).
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global respect for human rights.  This theory has received sympathetic
treatment in the jurisprudence of the ICJ75 and the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,76 and the Restatement on
Foreign Relations of the United States.77
Despite its popularity, the state-interest theory rests upon contest-
able jurisprudential foundations, and it lacks the resources necessary
to answer key questions about the scope of states’ authority to use
humanitarian countermeasures.  For example, there are good reasons
to question the state-interest theory’s vision of international human
rights conventions as reciprocal (synallagmatic) contracts that entitle
states to claim an individualized legal injury when other states violate
human rights abroad.78  Although the content of human rights agree-
ments may be fiercely negotiated, states’ legal obligations under these
agreements are best understood as parallel unilateral (gratuitous) un-
dertakings; states pledge to respect human rights for the benefit of
human beings without conditioning their own performance in any
way on other states’ performance of the same obligations.79  Human
rights conventions generate legal entitlements, but these entitlements
take the form of “rights and freedoms” that human beings may claim
against states rather than contractual rights that states may assert
against one another in pursuit of their respective national interests.
To be sure, some treaties such as the Genocide Convention permit
states to initiate enforcement proceedings before international tribu-
nals.80  The more natural reading of these provisions, however, is that
75 See East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 202 (June 30) (Weeramantry, J.,
dissenting).
76 See Prosecutor v. Furundzˇija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 151 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998).
77 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 211 cmt. b, 701 n.3, 703
cmt. b, 902 cmt. a (1987).
78 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 374 (9th ed. 2010) (defining a “synallagmatic con-
tract” as “[a] contract in which the parties obligate themselves reciprocally, so that the
obligation of each party is correlative to the obligation of the other” and explaining that
“[t]he term synallagmatic contract is essentially the civil-law equivalent of the common
law’s bilateral contract” (emphasis omitted)).
79 Cf. Louis Henkin, Human Rights and “Domestic Jurisdiction,” in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD 21, 30–31 (Thomas Buergenthal ed., 1977)
(characterizing human rights treaties as “mutual undertakings . . . for the benefit of third
parties”).
80 See, e.g., Genocide Convention, supra note 70, art. IX (“Disputes between the Con- R
tracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfillment of the present Con-
vention . . . shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of
the parties to the dispute.”); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms art. 24, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Conven-
tion] (“Any High Contracting Party may refer to the Commission, through the Secretary-
General of the Council of Europe, any alleged breach of the provisions of the Convention
by another High Contracting Party.”); American Convention on Human Rights art. 61,
Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention] (“[T]he States Par-
ties . . . shall have the right to submit a case to the Court.”); Slavery Convention art. 8, Sept.
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they permit states to enforce human rights for the benefit of op-
pressed foreign peoples despite the fact that their own legal interests are
not prejudiced by a target state’s conduct.81  Indeed, the ICJ appeared
to concede this point when it stated in the Genocide Convention Reserva-
tions Case that with respect to human rights norms such as the prohibi-
tion against genocide “one cannot speak of individual advantages or
disadvantages to States.”82  There are therefore good reasons to ques-
tion the idea that states may claim an injury to their legal interests
when other states violate the human rights of their own nationals
abroad.83
Even if states could claim an abstract interest in other states’ re-
spect for human rights, international law arguably prohibits states
from using countermeasures to advance this national interest rather
than the concrete entitlements of foreign human rights victims.  As
Giorgio Gaja has observed, “[i]t would be inconceivable that [a] State
would be entitled to claim compensation for its own benefit to make
reparation for damage that it has not suffered.”84  Nor may an inter-
vening state reasonably use humanitarian countermeasures to pursue
an ideological agenda of its own that is divorced from the actual needs
25, 1926, 212 U.N.T.S. 17 (as amended in 1953) (“The High Contracting Parties agree that
disputes arising between them relating to the interpretation or application of this Conven-
tion shall, if they cannot be settled by direct negotiation, be referred for decision to the
International Court of Justice.”).
81 See CRAWFORD, supra note 6, arts. 48 & 54 (characterizing humanitarian counter- R
measures as involving action by a State “other than an injured State” (emphasis added)); cf.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 60(2), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(providing that a state may suspend its treaty obligations (in the absence of an agreement
between the contracting parties) only if a material breach has “specially affected” that state
or has “radically change[d] the position of every party with respect to the further perform-
ance of its obligations”).  In recognition of the fact that states enforcing human rights
cannot claim any injury from human rights abuse abroad, the ILC ultimately declined to
characterize such responsive measures as “countermeasures.” CRAWFORD, supra note 6, art. R
54, cmt. 7; see also Nigel White & Ademola Abass, Countermeasures and Sanctions, in INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 531, 544 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 3d ed. 2010) (arguing for these reasons that
humanitarian countermeasures should be understood as “a modern form of non-forcible
measure or sanction that are outside the narrowly defined countermeasures regime”).
82 Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide,
Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28).
83 See Christian Hillgruber, The Right of Third States to Take Countermeasures, in THE
FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 265, 268 (Christian Tomuschat
& Jean-Marc Thouvenin eds., 2006) (“In principle, it is beyond doubt even today that, in
general, only a subject of international law conventionally understood to be directly af-
fected by a violation of international law may resort to reprisals against an offending
State.”); THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW
238–39 (1989) (“Conceptually, countermeasures are based on the principle of interstate
reciprocity, which, generally speaking, is foreign to human rights.” (citation omitted)).
But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 703, n.3 (1987) (“The custom-
ary law of human rights, however, protects individuals subject to each state’s jurisdiction,
and the international obligation runs equally to all other states, with no state a victim of
the violation more than any other.”).
84 Gaja, supra note 74, at 961. R
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or desires of foreign human rights victims.85  By all accounts, the
proper question when evaluating the proportionality of humanitarian
countermeasures is whether the particular coercive measures em-
ployed are necessary to address the harm that a foreign state has vis-
ited upon its own people, not whether the measures are necessary to
satisfy the intervening state’s own abstract interest in universal respect
for human dignity or compliance with international law.86  Hence, to
the extent that the state-interest theory grounds humanitarian coun-
termeasures in state interests rather than the rights of human beings,
it is out of step with international law’s insistence that intervening
states must use humanitarian countermeasures exclusively to further
the interests of oppressed peoples.
To be fair, most proponents of the state-interest theory do not
dispute that international human rights law vests legal interests prima-
rily in human beings; they simply contend that the law also gives states
a secondary legal interest in the enforcement of human rights
abroad.87  The precise scope of this secondary enforcement interest
and its relationship with the primary legal interests of human rights
holders remains obscure, however, under the state-interest theory.
For example, the state-interest theory offers no limiting principles to
explain when states may use countermeasures to enforce human
rights abroad.  If states may claim an enforceable legal interest in all
human rights of a “universal or quasi-universal” character, as the ICJ
intimated in Barcelona Traction, then in theory states could use coun-
termeasures to enforce any human rights norms that have “entered
into . . . general international law.”88  Yet this approach arguably cuts
too deeply into the customary prohibition against foreign interven-
tion.  If every human rights norm qualifies as an obligation erga omnes,
then states would enjoy a roving commission to impose countermea-
sures in response to any perceived human rights violation abroad,
85 See Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Third Rep. on State Responsibility, Int’l
Law Comm’n, ¶ 376, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/507 & Adds. 1–4 (Mar. 15, 2000) (by James Craw-
ford) [hereinafter Third Crawford Report].
86 See id. (“[P]rovisions for the invocation of responsibility on behalf of the interna-
tional community need to acknowledge the primacy of the interests of the actual victims.”).
87 See, e.g., Yoram Dinstein, The Erga Omnes Applicability of Human Rights, 30 ARCHIV DES
VO¨LKERRECHTS 16, 17–18 (1992).
88 Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 ¶¶ 33–34
(Feb. 5).  Indeed, as Sir Ian Sinclair noted during the ILC’s deliberations over the Articles
on State Responsibility, “in the broadest of all possible senses, it could be said that every State
ha[s] an interest in all rules of international law being observed.” Summary Records of the
Meetings of the Thirty-fifth Session, [1984] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 130 ¶ 27, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/SER.A/1983.  To their credit, some scholars have embraced this implication of the
state-interest theory.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 703 (describ-
ing various remedies for violation of human rights obligations); Juan-Antonio Carrillo-
Salcedo, Book Reviews and Notes, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes, 92 AM. J.
INT’L L. 791, 793 (1998); Dinstein, supra note 87, at 17. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-2\CRN203.txt unknown Seq: 20 12-JAN-15 14:44
288 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:269
irrespective of the scale or relative gravity of the violation.89  There is
little evidence that either state practice or opinio juris supports such an
expansive approach to humanitarian countermeasures.  While such
concerns do not, in and of themselves, prove that the state-interest
theory cannot succeed, they do suggest, at a minimum, that the state-
interest theory requires further refinement before it can serve as a
juridical theory of humanitarian countermeasures.
2. The Community-Interest Theory
As an alternative to the state-interest theory, some scholars have
construed Barcelona Traction to stand for the proposition that certain
human rights commitments are so important or fundamental to inter-
national society that they vest legal interests in the international com-
munity collectively.90  According to this theory, states undertake
human rights obligations for the purpose of constituting an interna-
tional public order that respects human dignity.91  Customary interna-
tional law, in turn, deputizes all states to enforce obligations erga omnes
on behalf of the international community as a whole.  What distin-
guishes obligations erga omnes from other norms, under this theory, is
not the “universal or quasi-universal” character of these obligations
per se but rather “the importance of the rights involved” to the integ-
rity of international legal order generally.92
89 See Third Crawford Report, supra note 85, at 30 ¶ 86 (“[O]n the face of it every State is R
considered as injured even by an individual and comparatively minor breach of the funda-
mental right of one person . . . .”).
90 See, e.g., Jost Delbru¨ck, Laws in the Public Interest – Some Observations on the Founda-
tions and Identification of Erga Omnes Norms in International Law, in LIBER AMICORUM GUN-
THER JAENICKE 17, 18 (1988); D.N. Hutchinson, Solidarity and Breaches of Multilateral Treaties,
59 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 151, 151–215 (1988); SANTIAGO VILLALPANDO, L’EMERGENCE DE LA
COMMUNAUTE´ INTERNATIONAL DANS LA RESPONSABILITE´ DES ETATS (2005) [hereinafter
VILLALPANDO, L’EMERGENCE]; Denis Alland, Countermeasures of General Interest, 13 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 1221, 1222 (2002) (conceptualizing the actions to protect these rights “counter-
measures of general interest”); Carrillo-Salcedo, supra note 88, at 793 (describing how the R
concept of obligations erga omnes creates a community interest); Peter D. Coffman, Obliga-
tions Erga Omnes and the Absent Third State, 39 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 285, 299–301 (1996)
(defining erga omnes more narrowly than just those rights that are important to the interna-
tional community); Santiago Villalpando, The Legal Dimension of the International Community:
How Community Interests are Protected in International Law, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 387, 401–02
(2010) [hereinafter Villalpando, Legal Dimension] (detailing how community interests are
defined and protected).
91 See Anne-Laure Vaurs-Chaumette, The International Community as a Whole, in THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 74, at 1023, 1024–25 (“Thus State re- R
sponsibility towards the international community translates into legal form the will to safe-
guard collective goods and values, including human rights, humanitarian law, self-
determination of peoples, the prohibition of genocide, respect for international peace,
and protection of the environment.”); VILLALPANDO, L’EMERGENCE, supra note 90, at R
308–09; Villalpando, Legal Dimension, supra note 90, at 391–92. R
92 Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 32 ¶ 33; see also Christian J. Tams, Individual States
as Guardians of Community Interests, in FROM BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTEREST: ESSAYS
IN HONOUR OF JUDGE BRUNO SIMMA 379, 380 (Ulrich Fastenrath et al. eds., 2011) (defining
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Although the community-interest theory is attractive in many re-
spects, the case for viewing human rights as universally enforceable
community interests is hardly watertight.  International human rights
conventions such as the ICCPR and the ICESCR do not purport to
confer any legal interests on the “international community as a
whole.”93  Moreover, even if the international community as a whole
may claim a collective legal interest in human rights compliance in
some sense, it is doubtful that states may enforce this collective inter-
est at their own discretion.  If international law authorized states to
use countermeasures to enforce the international community’s collec-
tive interest in respect for human rights standards, we might reasona-
bly expect to find support not only for coercive measures designed to
make human rights holders whole but also for broader sanctions de-
signed to uphold the international rule of law by deterring future vio-
lations or delivering retribution for past violations.  The fact that
punitive measures are widely understood to be beyond the scope of
legitimate humanitarian countermeasures strongly suggests that inter-
national law commits the enforcement of any such “community inter-
ests” exclusively to international institutions such as the Security
Council.94  Individual states arguably lack authority to enforce the in-
ternational community’s collective interests unless the Security Coun-
cil or some other international institution expressly delegates
enforcement authority.95  Whatever the ICJ might have meant by char-
“community interests” as encompassing “fundamental values as well as interests shared by
groups of States collectively”).  A particularly lucid expression of the community-interest
theory appears in the European Court of Human Rights’ judgment in the Pfunders Case.
Austria v. It. (Pfunders Case), App. No. 788/60, 4 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 3, 18 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. 1961).  The court reasoned that
the purpose of the High Contracting Parties in concluding the [European
Convention on Human Rights] was not to concede to each other reciprocal
rights and obligations in pursuance of their individual national interests
but . . . to establish a common public order of the free democracies of
Europe with the object of safeguarding their common heritage of political
traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law.
Id.
93 Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 32 ¶ 33.
94 See Alexis Blane & Benedict Kingsbury, Punishment and the Ius Post Bellum, in THE
ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: ALBERICO GENTILI AND THE JUSTICE OF EM-
PIRE 241–43 (Benedict Kingsbury & Benjamin Straumann eds., 2010) (observing that states
no longer formally justify countermeasures and other enforcement measures in punitive
terms).
95 See Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 35th Sess., May 14–Aug. 3, 1979, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc.
A/34/10, Supp. No. 10 (1979) (arguing that the rise of obligations erga omnes “has led the
international community to turn towards a system which vests in international institutions
other than States exclusive responsibility, first, for determining the existence of a breach of
an obligation of basic importance to the international community as a whole, and, thereaf-
ter, for deciding what measures are to be taken in response and how they are to be imple-
mented”). But see Tams, supra note 92, at 398 (suggesting that in some contexts R
“international legal rules accept that a particular State could/should act as trustee of the
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acterizing human rights as obligations “toward the international com-
munity as a whole,”96 there are good reasons to question the idea that
international law currently permits any individual state, in Prosper
Weil’s words, to “appoint itself the avenger of the international
community.”97
Setting aside such questions about state authority to enforce col-
lective interests, the community-interest theory also struggles to spec-
ify which human rights norms qualify as obligations erga omnes.
Advocates of the community-interest theory tend to argue that only
“fundamental”98 or “important”99 international norms qualify as obli-
gations erga omnes.  But disagreement persists as to which human
rights meet these standards.100  Some scholars have interpreted Barce-
lona Traction to permit humanitarian countermeasures only in re-
sponse to violations of international jus cogens.101  Others have
espoused the view that all international human rights are now ac-
cepted as “fundamental” to international legal order.102  Under the
logic of the community-interest theory, however, it remains unclear
why norms must be “fundamental” to qualify as “community interests”
in the first place, let alone how the international community should
decide whether a norm is sufficiently “fundamental.”  Equally uncer-
tain is whether community interests may be triggered by isolated
human rights violations or only “systematic breaches of human
rights.”103  Because it is unable to answer these questions, the commu-
international community simply because it is in the best position to protect the commu-
nity’s interest”).
96 Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 32 ¶ 33.
97 Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L L.
413, 432 (1983); see also Monica Hakimi, Unfriendly Unilateralism, 55 HARV. INT’L L.J. 105,
107–08 (2014) (raising similar concerns).
98 ANDRE´ DE HOOGH, OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: A THEO-
RETICAL INQUIRY INTO THE IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY OF STATES 56 (1996).
99 TAMS, supra note 2, at 130–31, 153. R
100 See Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 32 ¶ 34 (noting the differing definitions of
obligations erga omnes); see also MERON, supra note 83, at 194–96 (noting that erga omnes R
rights are broader than jus cogens); TAMS, supra note 2, at 153 (acknowledging the question R
of distinction is “difficult to answer in the abstract”).
101 E.g., TAMS, supra note 2, at 145 (suggesting that assessing erga omnes through a jus R
cogens view “might be fruitful”); cf. Third Crawford Report, supra note 85, ¶ 106 (asserting that R
obligations erga omnes are “virtually coextensive with peremptory obligations”); id. ¶¶ 374,
406 (suggesting that “the category [of obligations erga omnes] includes only a small number
of universally accepted norms” and that violations of these norms must be “well-attested”).
102 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 703(2) (1987) (“Any
state may pursue international remedies against any other state for a violation of the cus-
tomary international law of human rights.” (citation omitted)); MERON, supra note 83, at R
199 (“The distinction between basic human rights and human rights tout court, as regards
their erga omnes character, can no longer be regarded as settled law.”); Dinstein, supra note
87, at 17 (noting the Institut de Droit International’s support for this thesis). R
103 Third Crawford Report, supra note 85, ¶ 87. R
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nity-interest theory has proven to be only marginally helpful in clarify-
ing the scope of state authority to enforce the human rights of foreign
nationals abroad.  In sum, the meaning of Barcelona Traction’s enig-
matic dictum on “obligations erga omnes” remains deeply contested,
with scholars divided over whether these obligations should be under-
stood in terms of state interests, community interests, or both.  Al-
though the state-interest and community-interest theories are both
plausible interpretations of Barcelona Traction, both struggle to recon-
cile the nonreciprocal character of international human rights with
the reciprocal character of countermeasures, and neither theory pro-
vides clear criteria for identifying which international human rights
qualify as obligations erga omnes.
E. The ILC’s Inconclusive Debate
The ILC grappled with Barcelona Traction’s implications for the
law of countermeasures as it labored over what would become the
Articles on State Responsibility.104  For three decades, ILC members de-
bated whether obligations erga omnes should be conceptualized in
terms of state interests, community interests, or some other account of
state standing, and they struggled to reach consensus on the question
whether states could enforce these obligations through countermea-
sures.105  Although the ILC ultimately accepted the idea that all states
could assert standing to contest the violation of some international
human rights, it shied away from taking a firm position on the legality
of humanitarian countermeasures.106
Throughout the ILC’s deliberations, some ILC members argued
that the character of obligations erga omnes as “community interests”
would preclude state peer enforcement.  For example, in the years
immediately following Barcelona Traction, the ILC’s special rapporteur
on state responsibility, Roberto Ago, asserted that international law
“vests in international institutions other than States exclusive responsi-
bility, first, for determining the existence of a breach of an obligation
of basic importance to the international community as a whole, and,
thereafter, for deciding what measures are to be taken in response
and how they are to be implemented.”107  The next special rap-
porteur, Willem Riphagen, agreed with Ago’s assessment:
The precise determination of the acts permitted or allowed—what
measures are available and practicable, which of them should be
selected, what scope they should be given and by whom they should
104 See generally CRAWFORD, supra note 6, at 124–33 (discussing the abstracts of what R
constitutes the breach of an international obligation).
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 95, at 118–19. R
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be applied—is a matter which lies within the competence of the
appropriate political organs of the United Nations acting within
their authority under the Charter.108
Riphagen discerned “little evidence” of any other “accepted legal con-
sequences of serious breaches.”109  States might have a collective inter-
est in respect for human rights abroad, but only international
institutions such as the Security Council could undertake enforce-
ment action to protect this collective interest.110
Other members of the ILC were more sympathetic to humanita-
rian countermeasures.  Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, who succeeded
Riphagen as special rapporteur on state responsibility, accepted as-
pects of both the state-interest theory and the community-interest the-
ory.  Arangio-Ruiz argued not only that all states have a legal interest
in human rights compliance but that a state “indirectly injured” by
human rights violations abroad could claim “the same kind of rights
and faculte´s as those to which it would be entitled within the frame-
work of any bilateral . . . relationship.”111  Arangio-Ruiz also accepted
the idea that human rights constituted collective interests of the inter-
national community and that individual states could enforce these in-
terests on behalf of the international community as a whole: “In the
predominately inorganic condition of the inter-State system, even the
[enforcement] . . . of fundamental interests of the international com-
munity . . . seems to remain in principle, under general international
law, in the hands of States.”112
When James Crawford succeeded Arangio-Ruiz in 1995, he en-
deavored to resolve these debates within the ILC.113  This objective
108 Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Preliminary Rep. on the Content, Forms and
Degrees of International Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/330 (Apr. 1, 1980) (by Willem
Riphagen), reprinted in [1980] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 107, 121 ¶ 70, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1980/Add.1 [hereinafter Preliminary Report]; see also id. at 119 ¶ 64 (arguing that
when states breach obligations erga omnes, “the response in the first instance can only be a
collective one”).
109 Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Fourth Rep. on the Content, Forms and
Degrees of International Responsibility, ¶ 58, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/366 & Add. 1 (Apr. 14–15,
1983) (by Willem Riphagen); see also Third Crawford Report, supra note 85, at 26 ¶ 71 (noting R
that ILC members Sir Ian Sinclair and Nikolai Ushakov were not prepared to accept the
legality of humanitarian countermeasures).
110 Preliminary Report, supra note 108, at 121 ¶ 70. R
111 See Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Fourth Rep. on State Responsibility,
Int’l Law Comm’n, 46–47 ¶ 143 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/444 & Adds. 1–3 (1992) (by Gaetano
Arangio-Ruiz); Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Third Rep. on State Responsibility,
Int’l Law Comm’n, 28 ¶ 95 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/440 & Add. 1 (1991) (by Gaetano Arangio-
Ruiz).
112 Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Seventh Rep. on State Responsibility, Int’l
Law Comm’n, at 17 ¶ 71, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/469 (1995) (by Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz).
113 See Crawford, supra note 23, at 64–68 (discussing the complications of attaining R
appropriate collective countermeasures to protect injured states).
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proved to be elusive.114  Although few ILC members advocated
prohibiting humanitarian countermeasures entirely, there was a sharp
divergence of views on the best way to address the subject in the
Articles on State Responsibility.  Some ILC members argued that the
Articles should sidestep the question of humanitarian countermeasures
entirely because it “raises highly controversial issues about the balance
between law enforcement and intervention, in a field already contro-
versial enough.”115  Others argued that the ILC should stay the course
and provide at least some general guidance regarding the legal princi-
ples that govern humanitarian countermeasures.116
Under Crawford’s leadership, the ILC proposed for state com-
ment a draft article that would have allowed any state to impose coun-
termeasures if another state breached an obligation “to the
international community as a whole (erga omnes)” that was “established
for the protection of the collective interests of a group of States, in-
cluding that State.”117  One reasonable implication of this position,
the ILC suggested, was that states could use countermeasures to en-
force the human rights of foreign nationals abroad.118
Most states indicated that they were prepared to accept the legal
validity of humanitarian countermeasures,119 but several expressed
concerns.  For example, the United Kingdom questioned whether cus-
tomary international law supported a right to impose countermea-
sures in response to violations of obligations erga omnes, and it advised
the ILC that recognizing such a right prematurely might “disrupt the
established frameworks for the enforcement of human rights.”120
China argued that decentralized human rights enforcement “could
become one more pretext for power politics in international relations,
for only powerful States and blocs of States are in a position to take
countermeasures against weaker States.”121  These expressions of con-
cern underscored some ILC members’ lingering misgivings that inter-
national law might not permit states to use countermeasures to
114 See id. at 67–68.
115 Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Fourth Rep. on State Responsibility, Int’l
Law Comm’n, 18 ¶ 71 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/517 (Apr. 2, 2001) (by James Crawford) [herein-
after Fourth Crawford Report].
116 See id. at 18 ¶¶ 72–74.
117 Third Crawford Report, supra note 85, at 39. R
118 See id. at 106 ¶¶ 403–06 (“[It] is difficult to envisage that, faced with obvious, gross
and persistent violations of community obligations, third States should have no entitlement
to act.”).
119 TAMS, supra note 2, at 246–47 (“[A] large[ ] number of governments did not share R
that view but, expressly or by implication, accepted that in the case of serious breaches of
obligations ergo omnes, all States could resort to countermeasures.”).
120 State Comments, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/515 & Adds. 1–3 (Mar. 19, Apr. 3, May 1, June
28, 2001), at 82 ¶ 4.
121 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-2\CRN203.txt unknown Seq: 26 12-JAN-15 14:44
294 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:269
enforce collective interests of the international community as a
whole.122
In the end, the ILC decided to scale back its proposal.  Although
the final Articles on State Responsibility asserted that some international
obligations such as the prohibitions against slavery and racial discrimi-
nation are “owed to the international community as a whole,”123 the
ILC declined to embrace the idea that states could enforce these in-
terests without Security Council authorization, stating that “there ap-
pears to be no clearly recognized entitlement of States [not directly
injured] to take countermeasures in the collective interest.”124  The
ILC acknowledged that states had employed countermeasures to pro-
tect human rights on some occasions in the past, but it characterized
the relevant state practice as “sparse” and “embryonic.”125  The ILC
therefore inserted a savings clause in the Articles that merely preserved
this issue for future consideration in anticipation of the “further de-
velopment of international law.”126  Article 54, entitled “Measures
taken by States other than an injured State,” reads: “This chapter does
not prejudice the right of any State, entitled . . . to invoke the respon-
sibility of another State, to take lawful measures against that State to
ensure cessation of the breach and reparation in the interest of the
injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached.”127  By
bracketing the question of state peer enforcement in this manner, the
ILC ensured that the international community would continue to de-
bate the legal validity and permissible scope of humanitarian
countermeasures.
F. The Costs of Incomplete Theorization
Although the ILC declined to give its imprimatur to humanita-
rian countermeasures, this did not deter states from using these mea-
sures.  Since the ILC completed its work on the Articles on State
Responsibility, states have employed countermeasures with increasing
122 See Fourth Crawford Report, supra note 115, at 18 ¶ 71–74 (“The thrust of Govern- R
ment comments is that article 54, and especially paragraph 2, has no basis in international
law and would be destabilizing.”).
123 CRAWFORD, supra note 6, at 127, art. 48, cmt. 9. R
124 See id. at 139, art. 54, cmt. 6.
125 Id. pt. 3, ch. II, cmt. 8 & art. 54, cmts. 3 & 6.
126 Id. art. 54, cmt. 6.
127 Id. at 137, art. 54; see also id. art. 48, cmt. 8 (“This chapter does not purport to
regulate the taking of countermeasures by States other than the injured State.  It is, how-
ever, without prejudice to the right of any State identified in article 48, paragraph 1, to
take lawful measures against a responsible State to ensure cessation of the breach and
reparation in the interest of the injured State or the beneficiaries of the obligation
breached (art. 54).”).
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frequency to protect the human rights of foreign nationals abroad.128
Western powers such as the United States and the European Union
have been most aggressive in their use of humanitarian countermea-
sures, but they have been joined on occasion by states in Africa, Asia,
and the Middle East as well.129  These developments have prompted
the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights130 and a number of
legal scholars131 to conclude that humanitarian countermeasures are
now firmly ensconced in state practice as a lawful mechanism for in-
ternational law enforcement.
Despite these developments, even scholars sympathetic to hu-
manitarian countermeasures have been forced to concede that the le-
gal basis for these measures remains “very mysterious indeed.”132
Neither the state-interest theory nor the community-interest theory of
obligations erga omnes has earned the unalloyed confidence of the in-
ternational community, and for good reason.  Ultimately, neither the-
ory offers a satisfactory solution for reconciling the nonreciprocal
character of international human rights with the reciprocal character
of interstate countermeasures.  Although the ICJ has reaffirmed the
concept of obligations erga omnes on several occasions since Barcelona
128 See Martin Dawidowicz, Public Law Enforcement Without Public Law Safeguards? An
Analysis of State Practice on Third-Party Countermeasures and Their Relationship to the UN Security
Council, 77 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 333 (2007).
129 See TAMS, supra note 2, at 235–39 (“[A]lthough in the clear majority of cases, only R
western States have taken countermeasures, there is some practice by non-western States.
By supporting the armed struggle against apartheid, African States violated their obliga-
tions vis-a`-vis South Africa.”); Dawidowicz, supra note 128; Tams, supra note 92, at 390–91 R
(listing the use by Western and non-Western powers); supra note 4 and accompanying text. R
For example, many states have responded to recent human rights violations in Syria by
imposing trade embargos, asset freezes, and other coercive measures without obtaining
permission in advance from the Security Council. See EU to Impose Sanctions on Syrian Offi-
cials; UN to Send Team to Daraa, REUTERS (May 6, 2011, 7:25 PM), http://www.haaretz.com/
news/world/eu-to-impose-sanctions-on-syrian-officials-un-to-send-team-to-daraa-1.360276;
Syria Unrest: Arab League Adopts Sanctions in Cairo, BBC NEWS (Nov. 27, 2011, 5:51 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15901360.
130 See U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Thematic Study of the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures
on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, Including Recommendations Aimed at Ending Such Measures,
7–8 ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/33 (Jan. 11, 2012), available at http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session19/A-HRC-19-33_en.pdf
(“Where human rights or other obligations owed to the international community as a
whole (obligations erga omnes) are concerned, any State may take lawful measures against
the State that breached the said erga omnes obligation . . . .”).
131 See, e.g., O’CONNELL, supra note 3, at 245 (contending “the weight of opinion sup- R
ports the right of states to take countermeasures in cases of erga omnes obligations with a jus
cogens character”); TAMS, supra note 2, at 249–51 (suggesting that “individual States are R
entitled to take countermeasures in response to systematic or large-scale breaches of obli-
gations erga omnes”); Dawidowicz, supra note 128. R
132 MAURIZIO RAGAZZI, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES, at
xi (1997) (quoting Ian Brownlie, Presentation, To What Extent Are the Traditional Categories of
Lex Lata and Lex Ferenda Still Viable?, in CHANGE AND STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW-
MAKING 71 (Antonio Cassese & Joseph Weiler eds., 1988)).
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Traction, giving ammunition to supporters of humanitarian counter-
measures, its piecemeal contributions have scarcely begun to resolve
these debates.133  The legal basis and scope of state authority to use
humanitarian countermeasures thus remain deeply controversial.
The fog of uncertainty that surrounds humanitarian countermea-
sures has real-world costs, undermining international solidarity and
compromising the enforcement of international human rights.  Some
states have taken a page from Ago and Riphagen, refusing to enforce
the human rights of foreign peoples without Security Council authori-
zation based on professed concerns that international law does not
permit individual states to enforce collective interests of the interna-
tional community.134  Other states have imposed countermeasures to
advance their own national interests, despite the fact that their coer-
cive measures greatly aggravated human rights deprivations within tar-
get states.135  Meanwhile, skepticism about the legal validity of
humanitarian countermeasures has been intensifying throughout the
developing world, as reflected in a steady stream of General Assembly
resolutions calling for an end to “unilateral economic” coercion.136
133 See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 199 ¶ 155 (July 9) (finding that Israel violated
certain obligations erga omnes); East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 102 ¶ 29 (June
30) (supporting Portugal’s assertion of the right to self-determination, which “has an erga
omnes character”).
134 See, e.g., China: U.S. Has No Right to Impose Unilateral Sanctions Against Iran, PRESSTV
(Mar. 31, 2012; 12:35 PM), http://www.presstv.com/detail/233960.html (quoting China’s
Foreign Ministry statement: “The Chinese side always opposes one country unilaterally im-
posing sanctions against another according to [its] domestic law.  Furthermore, it does not
accept the unilateral imposition of those sanctions on a third country”); Russia, Belarus Call
Unilateral Sanctions ‘Counterproductive,’ PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (Oct. 31, 2012; 8:58 AM),
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90777/7998219.html (quoting Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov: “Only the U.N. Security Council is authorized to take coercive mea-
sures against countries that violate the international law”).  That Russia has used this argu-
ment opportunistically is underscored by its recent use of countermeasures against the
United States after the United States employed economic countermeasures in response to
Russia’s annexation of Crimea. See Wesley Lowery & Ed O’Keefe, Reacting to Sanctions,
Russians Ban Reid, Boehner and Four Other Senators, WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/03/20/reacting-to-sanctions-russians-
ban-reid-boehner-and-7-other-lawmakers/.
135 Studies suggest, for example, that economic coercion in Haiti and Iraq during the
early 1990s contributed to the death of hundreds of thousands from hunger and disease.
See, e.g., Sub-Commission Report, supra note 10, ¶¶ 58–100 (noting that the U.N. Security R
Council’s multilateral economic sanctions on Iraq in 1990 and 1991 led to “half a million
to a million and a half” deaths); Alberto Ascherio et al., Effect of the Gulf War on Infant and
Child Mortality in Iraq, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 931, 931 (1992) (estimating that “the Gulf war
and trade sanctions caused a threefold increase in mortality among Iraqi children under
five years of age”).
136 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 66/186, supra note 10 (resolving, inter alia, that “no State may R
use or encourage the use of unilateral economic . . . measures to coerce another State”);
G.A. Res. 62/162, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/162 (Mar. 13, 2008) (reaffirming that no
state may use economic coercion against another state to interfere with that state’s exercise
of sovereign rights); G.A. Res. 62/183, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/183 (Jan. 31, 2008)
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Whether the law of humanitarian countermeasures can rise above this
tide of deepening skepticism will depend, at least in part, on whether
the international community succeeds in developing a more coherent
and intelligible legal theory of state standing to enforce the human
rights of foreign peoples.
These dynamics suggest an urgent need for fresh thinking about
the jurisprudential foundations of humanitarian countermeasures.
To be useful in practice, a theory of humanitarian countermeasures
must be capable of providing principled answers to three questions.
First, what is the legal basis for states’ standing to contest human
rights violations abroad?  Second, how should the international com-
munity determine whether humanitarian countermeasures are pro-
portional?  Third, may states impose countermeasures in response to
any human rights violations abroad or only a limited subset (e.g., mas-
sive and systematic abuses, or violations of jus cogens)?  The remainder
of this Article furnishes answers to these questions.
II
A FIDUCIARY THEORY OF HUMANITARIAN COUNTERMEASURES
In the discussion that follows, I propose a new theory of humani-
tarian countermeasures that clarifies both the legal basis and the lim-
its of state standing to protect the human rights of foreign nationals
abroad.  Drawing inspiration from Grotius’s guardianship theory of
humanitarian intervention, I argue that in some settings international
law authorizes states to serve as fiduciaries on behalf of foreign peo-
ples for the purpose of imposing countermeasures to protect their in-
ternational human rights.
Fiduciary relationships arise in contexts where one party (the fi-
duciary) exercises discretionary power over the practical interests of
another party (the beneficiary).137  In many such relationships, the
fiduciary exercises a beneficiary’s legal rights on the beneficiary’s
behalf.  For example, guardians commonly buy and sell property on
behalf of their wards, agents enter contracts on behalf of their princi-
(same); G.A. Res. 51/17, U.N. Doc A/Res/51/17 (Nov. 12, 1996) (urging the United
States to repeal its embargo of Cuba).  The most recent of these resolutions passed by a
vote of 122 in favor to 2 opposed (the United States and Israel), with 53 abstaining. See also
Meetings Coverage, General Assembly, Effects of Global Crises on Poor Countries, Sustain-
able Development Conference Feature as General Assembly Considers Reports of Second
Committee, U.N. Meeetings Coverage GA/11200 (Dec. 22, 2011),  http://www.un.org/
Press/EN/2011/ga11200.doc.htm (“The Assembly adopted a draft resolution urging the
international community to eliminate unilateral coercive economic measures against devel-
oping countries . . . .”); TAMS, supra note 2, at 14 (“Whether States can take countermea- R
sures in response to erga omnes breaches is one of the most controversial issues in the law of
State responsibility.”).
137 See Paul B. Miller, Justifying Fiduciary Remedies, 63 U. TORONTO L.J. 570, 602 (2013)
(discussing the formal judicial structure of fiduciary relationships).
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pals, and lawyers file pleadings and negotiate settlements on behalf of
their clients.  In each of these settings, the fiduciary derives their au-
thority to act from the legal personality of their beneficiary.138
To protect beneficiaries from abuse, fiduciary law dictates that a
fiduciary may not unilaterally set the terms of their relationship with
their beneficiary.139  Instead, the law intercedes to set those terms by
imposing duties of loyalty and care, which honor the beneficiary’s au-
tonomy and safeguard the beneficiary from exploitation.140  Fiduciary
law thus obligates a fiduciary to exercise entrusted powers in a man-
ner that respects the beneficiary’s legitimate interests.
Viewing humanitarian countermeasures through the lens of fidu-
ciary obligation brings into focus both the privileged status of human
beings as the exclusive bearers of human rights and the derivative
character of state standing to challenge human rights violations
abroad.  When states impose humanitarian countermeasures, the le-
gal entitlements they seek to vindicate are those of foreign nationals
abroad.  In effect, states that use countermeasures to protect the
human rights of foreign peoples serve as fiduciary representatives, as-
serting the legal interests of foreign nationals on their behalf.  Their
standing to enforce the human rights of foreign peoples is not based
on their own independent legal interests, individual or collective.  Just
as a successor trustee has standing to enforce an errant trustee’s fidu-
ciary obligations on behalf of trust beneficiaries,141 under some cir-
cumstances all states have standing to enforce international human
rights obligations on behalf of oppressed peoples abroad.
This reframing of the formal legal basis for humanitarian coun-
termeasures has far-reaching theoretical and practical implications.
One important lesson of the fiduciary theory is that states bear a fidu-
ciary duty to use humanitarian countermeasures solely to advance the
interests of their beneficiaries abroad, not their own respective sover-
eign interests.  The fiduciary theory also clarifies which types of
human rights violations qualify for decentralized enforcement, and it
supplies a rich set of substantive principles to guide proportionality
analysis.  Lastly, the fiduciary theory dictates that states must respect
the self-determination of human rights holders by endeavoring to
consult with and respect the views of those whose rights they under-
take to protect.  In each of these respects, the fiduciary theory signifi-
138 See id. at 623.
139 See generally TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 106–07 (2010).
140 See id. at 106–20, 169–76 (2010) (discussing the fiduciary duties of loyalty and
care).
141 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 177 cmt. a (1959) (“The trustee is under a
duty to the beneficiary to take reasonable steps to enforce any claim which he holds as
trustee against predecessor trustees . . . .”).
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cantly strengthens the international legal regime for humanitarian
countermeasures.
A. Human Rights as Human Interests
To fully appreciate the fiduciary theory’s contribution, it will be
helpful to set the stage by examining briefly the juridical structure of
international human rights.
International human rights law is premised on a conception of
human rights as legal entitlements that safeguard the “inherent dig-
nity” and “equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family.”142  The distinguishing feature of international human rights,
in contrast to other international obligations, is that they are “specifi-
cally formulated in terms of the rights of [human beings]” rather than
states.143  Although international law charges states with protecting
the human rights of their people, it is doubtful that international law
gives states an independent legal interest in human rights observance.
As Crawford observed during the ILC’s deliberations over the Articles
on State Responsibility, “the language of human rights in the Charter of
the United Nations and in human rights texts since 1948” speaks ex-
clusively of human beings as rights holders; it “provides no reason for
treating human rights obligations as ‘allocatable’ to States ‘in the first
instance.’”144  While international human rights are clearly matters of
international concern in a general sense, the legal formulation of
these rights focuses on affirming the universal status of humans as
rights bearers rather than on generating rights for states inter se.  The
better view today, therefore, is that international human rights are
vested exclusively in, and hence can only be waived by, human rights
bearers.145
142 Universal Declaration of Human Rights pmbl., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
pmbl., Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1976) [hereinafter ICCPR] (asserting that human
rights “derive from the inherent dignity of the human person”).
143 Third Crawford Report, supra note 85, at 30 ¶ 89. R
144 Id. at 30–31 ¶ 89.  Crawford contrasted human rights with “rules relating to the
treatment of aliens in the field of diplomatic protection,” which “were deliberately articu-
lated as involving the rights of States, as [the Permanent Court of International Justice]
stressed in Mavrommatis [Palestine Concessions].” Id. at 30 ¶ 89.
145 Contemporary international human rights law thus marks a paradigm shift from
earlier conceptions of international law, which characterized all individual rights under
international law as state rights. Cf. 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 458 (3d ed.
1920) (suggesting that “where States stipulate by international treaties certain favours for
individuals . . . these individuals do not acquire any international rights under these trea-
ties, but the State whose subjects they are has an obligation towards the other States”).  For
discussion of the philosophical challenges facing state-centric (or, as he puts it, “human
concern”) approaches to human rights theory, see generally Jeremy Waldron, Human
Rights: A Critique of the Raz/Rawls Approach (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 13-32, 2013), available at http://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2272745.
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These features distinguish international human rights from other
international norms that are widely described as obligations erga
omnes.  For example, atmospheric and oceanic pollution violate obli-
gations erga omnes because every state suffers harm to its sovereign in-
terests whenever any state degrades resources that constitute the
shared patrimony of all mankind.146  Similarly, the prohibition against
aggression arguably qualifies as an obligation erga omnes because each
state owes this obligation to each of its peers to safeguard interna-
tional peace and security for all.147  According to Judge Stephen
Schwebel’s dissent in the ICJ’s Nicaragua case, states may also bear an
obligation erga omnes to publicize the location of minefields that may
endanger foreign nationals, such that any state whose nationals are
injured by undisclosed mines may demand reparations.148  In each of
these examples, states bear legal obligations toward every member of
the international community (erga omnes) to refrain from activities
that may cause legal injury to all others.  Any state that suffers legal
injury within one of these regimes of correlative rights and obligations
is entitled, therefore, to seek remedies through reciprocal
countermeasures.
If human rights can be characterized meaningfully as “obligations
erga omnes,” it must be in a very different sense.  Unlike ordinary obli-
gations erga omnes, a state’s human rights violations against its own
people do not injure other states’ individualized legal interests.  To
quote from the Genocide Convention Reservations Case once again, where
human rights are concerned, “States do not have any interests of their
own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely, the
accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison d’etre of
the convention.”149  The universal character of international human
rights that qualify as obligations erga omnes is not that they are owed to
all states (as the term “obligations erga omnes” implies), but rather that
they are (1) owed by all states subject to these norms (2) to all human
beings within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction, and that
they (3) may be enforced by all other states for the protection of human
rights holders.150
146 See Gabcˇı´kovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 88, 117–19 (Sept.
25) (Weeramantry, J.).
147 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 116 ¶ 223 (June 27).
148 See id. ¶ 269 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
149 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28).
150 In recognition of this fact, a leading monograph on obligations erga omnes argues
that the “essential idea is not that the obligations are owed to all States, but that in case of
the breach of such an obligation the corresponding rights of protection are in possession
of each and every State.” HOOGH, supra note 98, at 53. R
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To be sure, by conferring authority on states to enforce the
human rights of foreign peoples, customary international law arguably
gives all states an “interest” of sorts in human rights observance
abroad.  Yet this secondary enforcement interest, such as it is, cannot
be equated with human beings’ primary interest in human rights com-
pliance.  As Rene´ Provost has explained, international law permits
states to use humanitarian countermeasures “only because of the non-
existence of effective mechanisms at the international level permitting
individuals to act on their own behalf.  If effective remedies were put
at the disposal of individuals—a regime admittedly far from reality at
present—the justification for corresponding State rights would be
largely eliminated.”151  Just as children and incompetents who lack le-
gal capacity depend upon others to assert claims on their behalf,
human rights holders depend upon states to bring countermeasures
to enforce their human rights.
The remarkable feature of humanitarian countermeasures, in
short, is that states enforce human rights despite the fact that they
lack an independent legal interest of their own in another state’s
treatment of its people.  But if humanitarian countermeasures are not
designed for “self-help,” it is questionable whether they can be prop-
erly described as “countermeasures” at all.  Crawford suggested during
the ILC’s deliberations that this mismatch between the collective
rights of the international community and the disaggregated charac-
ter of state peer enforcement represents an “apparent paradox” for
“unilateral collective action.”152  Unable to resolve this paradox, the
ILC ultimately refused to characterize such measures as “countermea-
sures,” preferring the ambiguous term “lawful measures.”153
In the sections that follow, I defend the idea that humanitarian
countermeasures may be properly understood as a form of interstate
countermeasures, and I explain why states may impose countermea-
sures to protect the human rights of foreign nationals abroad despite
the fact that the legal interests they seek to protect are not their own.
I argue that the key to solving this puzzle can be found in Grotius’s
theory of humanitarian intervention as a form of fiduciary representa-
tion.  The fiduciary conception of humanitarian intervention offers a
theoretical framework that is capable of bridging the gap between in-
ternational human rights and the law of countermeasures, clarifying
both the legal basis and the limits of states’ authority to use coercion
on behalf of oppressed foreign peoples.
151 Rene´ Provost, Reciprocity in Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 65 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L
L. 383, 431 (1995).
152 Fourth Crawford Report, supra note 115, at 19 ¶ 76. R
153 CRAWFORD, supra note 6, art. 54, cmt. 7; see also id. (using the generic term “lawful R
measures” instead of “countermeasures”); White & Abass, supra note 81, at 531 (arguing R
that these measures are better characterized as “sanctions”).
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B. Hugo Grotius’s Theory of Humanitarian Intervention
Grotius devotes a chapter of his seminal treatise On the Law of War
and Peace to the “Causes of Undertaking War for Others.”154  He be-
gins by comparing the relationship between states and their subjects
to the relationship between parents and children.  According to
Grotius, both of these relationships involve the assumption of similar
duties: “whether any one presides over an household, or a state, the
first and most necessary care is the support of his dependents or sub-
jects.”155  Just as parents are responsible to provide for their depen-
dent children, the law of nature obligates states to care for their own
people, protecting subjects from external threats.
But suppose a state abuses its power by flagrantly oppressing its
own people?  Grotius observes that in such circumstances states may
be tempted to invoke their sovereign prerogative to preside undis-
turbed over their own household:
Though it is a rule established by the laws of nature and of social
order, and a rule confirmed by all the records of history, that every
sovereign is supreme judge in his own kingdom and over his own
subjects, in whose disputes no foreign power can justly interfere.
Yet where a Busiris, a Phalaris or a Thracian Diomede provoke their
people to despair and resistance by unheard of cruelties, having
themselves abandoned all the laws of nature, they lose the rights of
independent sovereigns, and can no longer claim the privilege of
the law of nations.  Thus Constantine took up arms against Maxen-
tius and Licinius, and other Roman emperors either took, or
threatened to take them against the Persians, if they did not desist
from persecuting the Christians.156
Grotius’s parent-child analogy provides the legal structure for this
argument, with the tyrannical ruler standing in the position of an abu-
sive parent.  Although both states and parents are entrusted with legal
authority to govern “by the laws of nature and of social order,” both
may forsake this authority by engaging in acts of intolerable cruelty.
Thus, a state that “provokes [its] people to despair” in this manner—
even if just a small minority, such as Christians in Persia—will no
longer enjoy “the rights” associated with sovereignty under the law of
nations, including “the privilege” of independence from foreign
intervention.157
154 GROTIUS, supra note 20, ch. XXV, pt. I. R
155 Id.
156 Id. ch. XXV, pt. VIII(1).
157 Cf. LOCKE, supra note 28, § 65 (arguing that parental “power so little belongs to the R
father by any peculiar right of nature, but only as he is guardian of his children, that when
he quits his care of them, he loses his power over them, which goes along with their nour-
ishment and education”).
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Grotius’s parent-child analogy helps to explain why states lack au-
thority to oppress their people, but it does not fully explain why other
states may claim authority to intervene on their own initiative to pro-
tect foreign peoples.  Grotius adverts to the legal basis for humanita-
rian intervention in the following passage:
Admitting that it would be fraught with the greatest dangers if
subjects were allowed to redress grievances by force of arms, it does
not necessarily follow that other powers are prohibited from giving
them assistance when labouring under grievous oppressions.  For
whenever the impediment to any action is of a personal nature, and
not inherent in the action itself, one person may perform for an-
other, what he cannot do for himself, provided it is an action by
which some kind service may be rendered.  Thus a guardian or any
other friend may undertake an action for a ward, which he is inca-
pacitated from doing for himself.
The impediment, which prohibits a subject from making resis-
tance, does not depend upon the nature of the occasion, which
would operate equally upon the feelings of men, whether they were
subjects or not, but upon the character of the persons, who cannot
transfer their natural allegiance from their own sovereign to an-
other.  But this principle does not bind those, who are not the liege-
subjects of that sovereign or power.  Their opposition to him or the
state may sometimes be connected with the defence of the op-
pressed, and can never be construed into an act of treason.158
To understand the implications of Grotius’s theory for current
debates over humanitarian countermeasures, it may be helpful to ex-
amine some of the key moves in his argument.  Like other interna-
tional lawyers of his generation, Grotius conceived of international
law as being based, in part, on the application to international rela-
tions of principles of universal “right reason, shewing the moral turpi-
tude, or moral necessity, of any act from its agreement or
disagreement with a rational nature.”159  Alongside this rationalistic
natural law, the law of nations (jus gentium) provided a system of posi-
tive rights applicable to the relations among sovereign states, and be-
tween sovereign states and their people, “deriving its authority from
the consent of all, or at least of many nations.”160
Under Grotius’s vision of the law of nations, subjects lacked au-
thority to rise up in rebellion against their own sovereign, except in
exceptional circumstances such as where a right to resist was explicitly
158 See GROTIUS, supra note 20, ch. XXV, pt. VIII(2)–(3). R
159 1 id. ch. I, pt. X(1).
160 1 id. ch. I, pt. XIV(1). But see H. Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International
Law, 1946 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 6–9 (observing that Grotius’s conception of the law of
nature is notoriously slippery).
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reserved to the people by contract.161  Just as minor children lacked
legal capacity to disavow the authority of their parents, once subjects
ceded authority to the state they generally lacked legal capacity to re-
call this authority.  This legal “impediment” was of “a personal na-
ture,” because it reflected the “character” (i.e., juridical status) of
human beings; it did not, however, call into question a people’s undis-
puted right to humane treatment under the law of nature.  Indeed,
Grotius took pains to acknowledge that “the nature of the occasion”
that sparked a rebellion (e.g., the atrocities of a Busiris, Phalaris, or
Diomedes) might well be so sinister as to “operate equally upon the
feelings of [all] men, whether they be subjects or not.” Nonetheless,
the fact that subjects had been exposed to “grievous oppressions” in
violation of the law of nature could not give them the legal capacity to
challenge their sovereign’s authority or transfer their allegiance en
masse to a new sovereign.
According to Grotius, the intercession of a foreign sovereign
solved this incapacity problem.162  Unlike subjects, foreign states indis-
putably possessed the requisite capacity to contest violations of the law
of nature by other states.163  But this solution to the problem of legal
capacity raised a new theoretical problem: From what source would
intervening states derive their authority to protect the rights of for-
eign nationals?
To establish the requisite connection between an intervening
state’s capacity to use force and an oppressed people’s rights to hu-
mane treatment under natural law, Grotius invoked the concept of
legal guardianship.164  In private law, Grotius noted, legal guardians
routinely undertake to care for minors or incompetents who have
been denied familial care through a parent’s death, disappearance,
incapacitation, or abusive or neglectful behavior.  The guardian, be-
ing a person of mature age, has the requisite legal capacity to exercise
power on behalf of their ward to protect the ward’s rights.  Hence,
while a ward could not initiate legal proceedings acting alone, a
guardian could initiate legal proceedings to obtain remedies on the
ward’s behalf.  Thus, the appointment of a legal guardian in private
law enables a ward to vindicate rights that the ward could not enforce
independently.
According to Grotius, similar principles of fiduciary representa-
tion govern humanitarian intervention.  When a tyrannical state
161 See 1 GROTIUS, supra note 20, ch. IV, pt. II; 1 id., ch. IV, pt. I(3); Straumann, supra R
note 27.  Grotius made allowance for individuals to exercise a limited right of resistance for R
self-preservation. See 1 GROTIUS, supra note 20, ch. IV, pt. VII. R
162 2 GROTIUS, supra note 20, ch. XXV, pt. VIII.
163 Id.
164 Id.
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subjects its people to particularly “grievous oppressions,” natural law
would permit other states to serve as temporary guardians for the pur-
pose of protecting the oppressed people’s rights.165  According to
Grotius, states are not “bound to risk their own safety” by assuming
the burden of guardianship—“even when the aggrieved or oppressed
party cannot be relieved but by the destruction of the invader or op-
pressor.”166  The choice to serve as a guardian for foreign peoples is
committed to the discretionary judgment of each state.167  Once a
state has voluntarily undertaken this responsibility, however, the state
may represent an oppressed people as guardian for the purpose of
protecting their right to humane treatment.168
Grotius was not the first theorist, nor would he be the last, to
characterize humanitarian intervention as a form of other-regarding
guardianship.  Nearly a century before Grotius penned On the Law of
War and Peace, the great Spanish scholar Francisco de Vitoria argued
that natural law authorized European nations to intervene as guardi-
ans for indigenous peoples of the New World whose rulers engaged in
“tyrannical and oppressive acts” such as human sacrifice and cannibal-
ism.169  Alberico Gentili sought to justify foreign intervention in de-
fense of oppressed foreign peoples by analogizing the practice to the
protection of children from an abusive parent.170  Pufendorf also em-
braced Grotius’s argument that states could represent oppressed for-
eign nationals for purposes of vindicating their right to resist
“barbarous savagery.”171  Vattel would later concur that whenever a
state severs “the bands of the political society” by engaging in tyranni-
cal acts that spark a rebellion, “every foreign power has a right to
succour an oppressed people who implore their assistance.”172  Al-
165 Id.
166 Id. pt. VII.
167 Id.
168 Id. pt. VIII.
169 Franciscus de Victoria, On the Indians Lately Discovered, in DE INDIS ET DE IVRE BELLI
RELECTIONES 115, 159 (Ernest Nys ed., John Pawley Bate trans., Gibson Brothers 1917)
(1696).  That Vitoria’s guardianship theory was exploited as a pretext for colonial domina-
tion has been well documented. See, e.g., ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND
THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 28–30 (2005); Evan J. Criddle, A Sacred Trust of Civiliza-
tion: Fiduciary Foundations of International Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY
LAW 404, 406–08 (Andrew Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS]; ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 167–69 (1990).  In Part II, I consider whether
the guardianship tradition can be rehabilitated for humanitarian countermeasures in a
manner that would overcome this grim historical legacy.
170 2 ALBERICO GENTILI, DE IURE BELLI LIBRI TRES bk. 1, ch. 16, at 74–76 (John C.
Rolphe trans., 1933) (1612).
171 PUFENDORF, supra note 32, § 14 (citing Grotius). R
172 VATTEL, supra note 30, § 56, ¶ 1.  In contrast to Grotius, Vattel argued that states R
could not intervene until an oppressed people had taken up arms against a tyrannical
ruler.
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though Vattel resisted the idea that intervening states could dictate
the domestic policy of a foreign state, he concluded (with a nod to
Grotius) that the law would permit any state to deliver “the world from
an Antæas, a Busiris, [or] a Diomede”—“monsters who, under the ti-
tle of sovereigns, render themselves the scourges and horror of the
human race.”173  The fiduciary conception of international interven-
tion developed by these early pioneers of international law would con-
tinue to influence international legal theory for generations,
furnishing a legal framework for League of Nations mandates, U.N.
trusteeships, and even the law of belligerent occupation.174
Grotius’s guardianship theory of humanitarian intervention
proved to be influential over time because it explained why states,
while formally equal to one another and lacking a direct legal interest
in others’ treatment of their own citizens, could nonetheless assert
standing to protect foreign nationals from grave abuse.  Once a state
had ruptured its own fiduciary relationship with its people through
monstrous acts of oppression, the law of nature entrusted other states
with authority to serve as temporary guardians for the purpose of pro-
tecting an oppressed people’s natural rights.  Intervening states thus
employed their own legal capacity to use force while deriving their
legal standing from the abuses visited upon an oppressed people
abroad.
Grotius’s guardianship theory of foreign intervention continues
to repay close attention because it offers an attractive alternative to
Grotius’s own preferred account of the legal basis for decentralized
international law enforcement.  Elsewhere in On the Law of War and
Peace, Grotius suggests that natural law would permit “any one of com-
petent judgment” and clean hands to punish inhumane acts unilater-
ally, irrespective of where or against whom they occur.175  Grotius’s
guardianship theory, in contrast, does not rely on this dubious notion
of a universal, unilateral natural right to punish.  By grounding hu-
manitarian intervention in a fiduciary conception of foreign guardian-
ship, Grotius offers a vision of foreign intervention that removes the
sting of “unilateralism” from decentralized international law enforce-
ment.  On Grotius’s guardianship account, intervening states exercise
173 Id. ¶¶ 3–4.
174 See Criddle, supra note 169, at 407, 411–12; Ralph Wilde, From Trusteeship to Self- R
Determination and Back Again: The Role of the Hague Regulations in the Evolution of International
Trusteeship, and the Framework of Rights and Duties of Occupying Powers, 31 LOY. L.A. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 85, 94 n.13 (2009).
175 See GROTIUS, supra note 20, ch. XX, pt. VII; see id. pt. XL (asserting that states “have R
a right to exact punishment not only for injuries affecting immediately themselves or their
own subjects, but for gross violations of the law of nature and of nations, done to other
states and subjects”). But see Hakimi, supra note 97, at 144–45 (challenging the view that
unilateral or disobedient exercises of power must be antithetical to law).
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rights of resistance that belong ultimately to the oppressed people
whom they seek to protect.176  The law of nature entrusts this respon-
sibility to any worthy intervening state that volunteers for this assign-
ment, and it mediates the relationship between the intervening state
and its foreign beneficiaries, ensuring that the intervening state can-
not unilaterally set the terms of its interaction with a foreign people.
The “guardian” state bears fiduciary duties of loyalty and care toward
its foreign “wards,” such that it may use force solely for their benefit.
If the intervening state fails to satisfy these fiduciary obligations, its
actions are subject to review and collective accountability before the
rest of the international community.  Thus, despite Grotius’s well-
earned reputation as a proponent of unilateral law enforcement, his
argument for humanitarian intervention ultimately rests on the nor-
matively anti-unilateralist foundation of fiduciary obligation.
C. The Juridical Structure of Fiduciary Representation
Over time, Grotius’s guardianship theory of humanitarian inter-
vention has receded into the mists of history.177  No contemporary
scholar, to my knowledge, has addressed how Grotius’s theory might
apply to humanitarian countermeasures.  This is unfortunate, because
Grotius’s fiduciary account of foreign intervention offers a powerful
framework for conceptualizing the juridical structure of humanitarian
countermeasures under contemporary international law.178  The core
features of Grotius’s theory provide a fresh and compelling solution to
the “apparent paradox” of “unilateral collective action.”179  Grotius’s
theory also furnishes the resources that are necessary to answer the
three questions about humanitarian countermeasures that were posed
at the close of Part I.
We are now prepared to consider each of these questions in turn.
The first asks: What is the legal basis for state standing to protect the human
rights of foreign nationals abroad?  This question is crucially important
176 See GROTIUS, supra note 20, ch. XXV, pt. VIII; see also PUFENDORF, supra note 32, R
§ 14.
177 Passing references to Grotius’s fiduciary conception of humanitarian intervention
can be found in Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal
Norm?, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 99, 111 (2007), and Barry M. Benjamin, Unilateral Humanitarian
Intervention: Legalizing the Use of Force to Prevent Human Rights Atrocities, 16 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 120, 127 (1992).  Many other works discuss Grotius’s theory of humanitarian interven-
tion without focusing on the fiduciary structure of his argument. See, e.g., CHARLES S.
EDWARDS, HUGO GROTIUS: THE MIRACLE OF HOLLAND 129–38 (1981); R.J. Vincent, Grotius,
Human Rights, and Intervention, in HUGO GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 241,
241–56 (Hedley Bull et al. eds., 1990).
178 For purposes of this Article, I take no position on whether customary international
law supports decentralized humanitarian military intervention, the primary focus of
Grotius’s guardianship theory.
179 Fourth Crawford Report, supra note 115, ¶ 76. R
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because the law of countermeasures ordinarily requires states to estab-
lish an individualized legal injury before they may use coercive mea-
sures against a state that has engaged in internationally wrongful
conduct.180
As we have seen, legal scholars have argued in the past that states
may assert standing to use humanitarian countermeasures because at
least some, if not all, human rights commitments are owed to every
other state either individually (the state-interest theory) or collectively
(the community-interest theory).181  In contrast, the fiduciary theory
takes human rights on their own terms as rights that international law
vests exclusively in human beings.182  States bear obligations under in-
ternational law that are correlative to these human rights.183  When
intervening states bring countermeasures to protect the human rights
of foreign nationals abroad, international law authorizes them to do
so only as representatives for foreign human rights holders.184  As
Riphagen recognized during the ILC’s deliberations, the legal interest
that intervening states protect in such instances is one that states are
“given, so to speak, ‘in trust,’ for the benefit of [human beings].”185
When states use countermeasures to enforce the international human
rights of foreign peoples, they serve as fiduciary representatives and
bear fiduciary duties to exercise their coercive powers in the best in-
terests of foreign nationals.
This account of the juridical basis for humanitarian countermea-
sures resonates with Eyal Benvenisti’s vision of “sovereigns as trustees
of humanity.”186  Benvenisti argues that “sovereigns can and should be
viewed as organs of a global system that allocates competences and
responsibilities for promoting the rights of all human beings and their
interest in sustainable utilization of global resources.”187  Within this
global system, all states serve as fiduciaries for human beings, with
each state individually bearing a special responsibility to guarantee
fundamental security under the rule of law for people within its own
sovereign jurisdiction.  Extending Benvenisti’s account, this Article
suggests that when any state violates the human rights of its own peo-
180 See CRAWFORD, supra note 6, art. 49, cmt. 2. R
181 See supra Part I.D.1–2.
182 See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text.
183 See supra note 150 and accompanying text. R
184 See supra notes 149–51 and accompanying text. R
185 Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Second Rep. on the Content, Forms and
Degrees of International Responsibility, ¶ 61, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/344 (May 1, 1981) (by Willem
Riphagen); 3 PHILLIMORE, supra note 35, at 10 (arguing that the states’ authority to use R
reprisals on behalf of their subjects reflects the idea “that individuals have committed the
defense of themselves to the State of which they are members”).
186 Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to
Foreign Stakeholders, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 308 (2013).
187 Id. (paraphrasing Max Huber).
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ple, international law allows other states to exercise authority to en-
force states’ obligations under international human rights law as
fiduciaries of necessity for the benefit of foreign nationals.
In this respect, the representative role of intervening states bears
important similarities to a variety of fiduciary relationships in private
law.  Like a successor trustee or agent of necessity, intervening states
are authorized to step in as surrogate fiduciaries in situations where
the primary fiduciary (the host state) is unable or unwilling to satisfy
its own fiduciary obligations.188  Similar to class action lawyers in
American civil litigation, the law permits (but does not require) states
to take steps to establish a representative relationship with vulnerable
individuals who would be unable to assert their rights effectively with-
out assistance.189  Shareholder derivative litigation offers another illu-
minating reference point: because corporations are incapable of
vindicating their own rights without representation, the law authorizes
fiduciaries of necessity (shareholders) to vindicate a corporation’s
rights when the primary fiduciary who would ordinarily discharge this
responsibility (the corporate board) is implicated in wrongdoing.190
Humanitarian countermeasures bear a similar juridical structure.
When states step in to assert the human rights of foreign nationals on
their behalf as authorized under customary international law, states
serve as fiduciaries of necessity to vindicate the rights of oppressed
peoples abroad who lack the legal and practical capacity to protect
their own legal interests.  States’ standing to enforce international
human rights abroad thus constitutes a secondary right of enforce-
ment that is derived from, and is entirely dependent upon, the pri-
mary legal entitlements of human rights holders.  Although the
international community has not expressly defined humanitarian
countermeasures as a form of fiduciary representation, the fiduciary
theory best explains the juridical structure of the relationship estab-
lished under customary international law between intervening states
and human rights holders.
Why does international law entrust intervening states with author-
ity to represent oppressed foreign peoples for the purpose of bringing
188 See EVAN FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE: THE STATE AS FIDUCIARY 132 (2011)
(explaining that when shipmasters “find themselves in an emergency situation that places
the cargo they are carrying in imminent peril” they “may act without prior authority as an
agent of the cargo’s owner in order to protect the goods or their value”); JESSE DUKEMINIER
& ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 587, 653 (9th ed. 2013) (observing that
when a “trust instrument explicitly divides the functions of trusteeship among . . . co-trust-
ees, each trustee remains under a continuing duty to take reasonable steps to prevent a
breach of trust by a co-trustee” and “has standing to sue the trustee for breach of duty”).
189 See 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (establishing a grant to states for the
appointment of an individual to represent children in child-abuse proceedings).
190 See Ann M. Scarlett, Shareholder Derivative Litigation’s Historical and Normative Founda-
tions, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 837, 892–93 (2013).
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countermeasures?  Grotius’s guardianship theory suggests that this
feature of contemporary international law responds to human beings’
legal and practical incapacity to access the protection of countermea-
sures without state assistance.  Although contemporary international
law respects the rights of human beings to contest state oppression in
a variety of ways, only states have the formal juridical capacity to use
countermeasures in response to international wrongs.  Without repre-
sentation from a foreign state, therefore, human rights victims would
be deprived of a powerful mechanism for protecting their rights from
continuing abuse at the hands of their state.  By authorizing all states
to enforce human rights as fiduciary representatives, international law
today provides a mechanism whereby human rights holders may ac-
cess effective international remedies for violations to their human
rights.191
The universal character of state standing reflects international
law’s presumption that all states are well positioned to represent op-
pressed peoples for purposes of imposing humanitarian countermea-
sures.  Although the fiduciary theory resists the idea that states may
claim a direct legal interest in human rights abroad, the shared moral
interests of the international community play a crucial role in consti-
tuting the fiduciary relationship between states and foreign peoples.
As proponents of the community-interest theory have observed, uni-
versal respect for human rights has become a foundational principle
of international public order.  All states, to be legal orders rather than
merely coercive orders, must at least purport to be concerned about
universal respect for human rights.  In an era when international law
requires all states to embrace a common commitment to respect, pro-
tect, and fulfill human rights for the benefit of humanity, all states
may plausibly claim a legitimate moral interest in universal respect for
human rights.  Precisely for this reason—because all states under in-
ternational law share a “common tie” to the “[c]ommon [n]ature” of
humanity, as Grotius puts it192—international law entrusts all states
with authority to represent human rights holders abroad.
The fiduciary theory thus clarifies how state and community in-
terests are relevant to humanitarian countermeasures: rather than
constituting distinct legal interests that may be “injured” by human
rights abuse abroad (as the state-interest and community-interest the-
ories, respectively, posit), states’ formal commitment to common legal
standards qualify all states to serve as representatives for the limited
191 As Benvenisti has observed, “the principle of (individual and collective) self-deter-
mination itself entails limitations on the exclusive rights of [sovereign states].”  Benvenisti,
supra note 186, at 313.  Self-determination would be frustrated if states could deny their R
own nationals and others within their borders the full protection of international human
rights.
192 See GROTIUS, supra note 20, ch. XXV, pt. VI. R
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purpose of imposing countermeasures to protect human rights.193  All
states may assert a genuine legal interest in human observance abroad
under the fiduciary theory, but this interest is derived from, and en-
tirely dependent upon, their role as authorized representatives for the
primary legal interests of human beings.
Although the Articles on State Responsibility endorse the commu-
nity-interest theory,194 there is some evidence that ILC members antic-
ipated core elements of the fiduciary theory.  For example, in
commentary preceding the final Articles, Crawford observed:
Even in the case of well-attested, gross or systematic violations of
human rights, it is suggested that a distinction should still be drawn
between the rights of the victims and the responses of States.  Oth-
erwise the effect . . . is to translate human rights into States’ rights,
and this seems no more justified when one is dealing with systematic
violations than with individual ones . . . .  The States concerned may
be representing the victims, but they are not to be identified with
them, and they do not become the rights-holders because they are
recognized as having a legal interest in the author State’s compli-
ance with its human rights obligations.195
Where humanitarian countermeasures are concerned, Crawford rec-
ognized, the primary legal interests are those of human rights holders,
not states.  Although the ILC would later take the position that inter-
national human rights norms are “established for the protection of a
collective interest” and are “owed to the international community as a
whole,”196 it stopped short of characterizing the international commu-
nity’s “collective interest” as sufficient to qualify all states to claim an
“injury” from human rights violations abroad.197  Instead, the ILC fo-
cused on the idea that all states were plausibly “entitled . . . to take
193 Most legal scholars agree that international law does not authorize states to engage
in military intervention for humanitarian purposes without either Security Council authori-
zation or the host state’s consent. See Oona A. Hathaway et al., Consent-Based Humanitarian
Intervention: Giving Sovereign Responsibility Back to the Sovereign, 46 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 499,
521–35 (2013); Saira Mohammed, Restructuring the Debate on Unauthorized Humanitarian In-
tervention, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1285–89 (2010); Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN, and the Use
of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 3–4 (1999).  In settings where states have re-
ceived valid authorization for humanitarian military intervention, however, there are good
reasons to believe that this authority also entails fiduciary responsibilities. See Evan J. Crid-
dle, Reclaiming the Grotian Theory of Humanitarian Intervention 2 (Dec. 9, 2014) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author) (“When the Security Council green-lights
humanitarian intervention, it entrusts states with discretionary power over the legal and
practical interests of foreign nationals, and intervening states bear a concomitant fiduciary
obligation to exercise this power exclusively for the benefit of their designated benefi-
ciaries—foreign nationals whose human rights are at risk.”).
194 See CRAWFORD, supra note 6, art. 48(1)(a)–(b) & art. 48, cmts. 7, 9. R
195 Third Crawford Report, supra note 85, at 30–39 ¶ 87. R
196 CRAWFORD, supra note 6, art. 48(1)(a)–(b) & art. 48, cmts. 7, 9. R
197 See id. arts. 48 & 54 (speaking of measures taken by “States other than the injured
State”).
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lawful measures against the responsible State . . . in the interest
of . . . the beneficiaries of the obligation breached.”198  The Articles
can be read, therefore, as incorporating the fiduciary theory’s core
insight that the international community may enforce human rights
abroad only as fiduciary representatives for human rights holders.199
In sum, the fiduciary theory resolves the “apparent paradox” of
“unilateral collective action” by explaining how coercive measures un-
dertaken by states to protect human rights abroad can reasonably be
characterized as “countermeasures”—albeit in a novel sense.200  Inter-
national law entrusts all states with authority to enforce prohibitions
against grave human rights abuse as fiduciary representatives for
human rights holders abroad.  Although these coercive measures are
a form of decentralized international law enforcement, they are not
“unilateral” in a normative sense.  Under the fiduciary theory, interna-
tional law regulates when states may intervene as fiduciary representa-
tives, and it sets the terms of the relationship between an intervening
state and human rights holders abroad.  In particular, an intervening
state’s authority to use humanitarian countermeasures is circum-
scribed by fiduciary duties that safeguard the legitimate interests of
foreign peoples.  The exercise of this entrusted authority, moreover, is
subject to the continuous review of the international community as a
whole.  Thus, far from asserting a Lockean right of unilateral enforce-
ment, the fiduciary theory suggests that states that use countermea-
sures to enforce the human rights of foreign peoples operate within a
fiduciary relationship that is mediated by the rule of international
law.201
D. The Duties of Fiduciary Representation
Having established the legal foundation for humanitarian coun-
termeasures, we are prepared now to take up the second question
posed in Part I: How should the international community determine whether
humanitarian countermeasures are proportional?  The Articles on State Re-
sponsibility dictate that countermeasures “must be commensurate with
the injury suffered, taking into account the gravity of the internation-
198 Id. art. 54, cmt. 7.
199 See id. (asserting that states are “entitled . . . to take lawful measures against the
responsible State . . . in the interest of . . . the beneficiaries of the obligation breached”).
200 Fourth Crawford Report, supra note 115, at 19 ¶ 76. R
201 Of course, when states enforce human rights in a manner that exceeds the scope of
their authority under international law, such actions may justly be described as “unilateral-
ism” or, more provocatively, “international vigilantism.”  Hutchinson, supra note 90, at 202. R
This may be the best reading of General Assembly resolutions that broadly condemn “uni-
lateral economic . . . coercion.” E.g., G.A. Res. 62/183, supra note 136, ¶ 2 (urging the
international community to “eliminate the use of unilateral coercive economic mea-
sures . . . that are not authorized by relevant organs of the United Nations or are inconsis-
tent with the principles of international law”).
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ally wrongful act and the rights in question.”202  Under the state-
interest and community-interest theories, the “injury suffered” by in-
tervening states or the international community as a whole would be
wholly metaphysical: the abstract interest in mutual adherence to
shared legal commitments, enhanced perhaps by the threat that non-
compliance poses to international order generally.203  In practice,
however, advocates of both theories have tended to ask whether coun-
termeasures are narrowly tailored to ensure respect for the concrete
human rights of human beings, not whether countermeasures suc-
ceed in ensuring respect for international commitments or public or-
der in the abstract.204  The fiduciary theory explains why this focus on
individual interests is entirely appropriate.  Because the injury to be
remediated is an injury to human rights (not the rights of states or the
international community as a whole), intervening states must ask
whether countermeasures are reasonably calculated to induce a target
state to provide remedies to human rights holders (not states or the
international community as a whole).
The fiduciary theory situates this proportionality inquiry within a
robust juridical framework that clarifies the metes and bounds of state
discretion.  Under the classic fiduciary duty of loyalty, fiduciaries in
private law are obligated to exercise their entrusted discretionary pow-
ers to advance the interests of their beneficiaries.205  By the same
token, when states undertake to impose countermeasures on behalf of
human rights victims abroad, they are duty bound to exercise their
coercive powers in a manner that honors the fiduciary character of
their relationship with human rights holders abroad.  Several discrete
principles flow from this fiduciary relationship.206
First, the principle of integrity dictates that intervening states must
use countermeasures to pursue the good of their beneficiaries—
human rights holders—rather than their own private interests.  Under
the principle of integrity, states may not exploit human rights crises as
a pretext to dominate another state.  To satisfy the principle of
202 CRAWFORD, supra note 6, art. 51; see also Gabcˇı´kovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./ R
Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶¶ 78, 85, 87 (Sept. 25) (finding that Czechoslovakia’s countermea-
sure of unilaterally assuming control of the Danube was not commensurate with Hungary’s
internationally wrongful act of withdrawing its consent to joint operations in the Danube).
203 See, e.g., MERON, supra note 83, at 200 (recognizing that the ability of states to bring R
claims against human rights abuses highlights “deeply rooted community values attached
to the universal protection of human rights”); Villalpando, Legal Dimension, supra note 90,
392 (asserting that states have become aware of a need to protect “common goods or val-
ues, such as peace, humanity, or the environment”).
204 Cf. MERON, supra note 83, at 239–40 (asserting that a state’s countermeasures which R
suspended its own human rights obligations would be “clearly unacceptable”).
205 See Lionel Smith, Can We Be Obliged to Be Selfless?, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
141 (2014) (discussing the constitutive features of the duty of loyalty).
206 Evan Fox-Decent and I discuss some of these principles in Evan J. Criddle & Evan
Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 331, 363–66 (2009).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-2\CRN203.txt unknown Seq: 46 12-JAN-15 14:44
314 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:269
integrity and prevailing norms of customary international law, states
that freeze foreign assets must administer asset freezes for a foreign
people’s benefit, preserving the frozen funds and allowing them to
continue to accrue interest until a freeze has been lifted.207
Second, under the principle of solicitude, an intervening state as
fiduciary representative must give due and sensitive regard to the le-
gitimate interests of its foreign beneficiaries.  Humanitarian counter-
measures are prohibited under the principle of solicitude if they may
be expected to generate an injury to economic or other human rights
that is disproportionate to an intervening state’s palliative objectives.
One implication of this principle is that intervening states may not
impose harsh economic measures that would substantially exacerbate
human suffering within a target state.208
To the extent that states use countermeasures to protect some
foreign nationals from abuse to the possible detriment of other for-
eign nationals, two other fiduciary principles derived from the duty of
loyalty have special salience.  Under the principle of impartiality, inter-
vening states must give “due regard” to the respective interests of for-
eign nationals with competing interests, seeking a sense of balance
between these interests to ensure that all people of a target state are
respected as cobeneficiaries.209  Paired with the principle of impartial-
ity is a fiduciary principle of minority protection, which dictates that in
seeking to advance the interests of their beneficiaries, intervening
states must devote special consideration to the special vulnerabilities
of particular groups or individuals.  In the corporate law context, this
means that corporate directors bear heightened fiduciary duties to-
ward minority shareholders who may be vulnerable to exploitation by
controlling shareholders.210  Translated for the law of humanitarian
countermeasures, this principle dictates that intervening states may
207 See PAUL CONLON, UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS MANAGEMENT: A CASE STUDY OF THE
IRAQ SANCTIONS COMMITTEE, 1990–1994, at 5 (2000) (observing that during an interna-
tional asset freeze, an intervening state must conserve frozen assets and allow them “to
accrue interest that ultimately belongs to the target state, although [the interest] may not
be paid while the sanctions are in force,” and characterizing this obligation as one “of
stewardship”).  During World War I, for example, the United States transferred frozen
enemy assets to an alien property custodian to administer the assets as a “trus-
tee . . . charged with the duty of protecting and caring for the property until the end of the
war,” all the while giving “no thought [to] the confiscation or dissipation of the property
thus held in trust.”  Otto C. Sommerich, A Brief Against Confiscation, 11 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 152, 160 (1945) (quoting the U.S. Alien Property Custodian in Bulletin No. 159).
208 See CRAWFORD, supra note 6, art. 50(1)(b) & cmts. R
209 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 188, at 657–58 (observing that the “duty of R
impartiality” in trust law is inaptly named because it does not require impartiality in the
sense of equality, but rather a balancing by giving due regard to the beneficiaries’ respective
interests); Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621,
651 (2004) (“[B]alance is the overarching directive of the duty of impartiality.”).
210 See generally Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119
(2003) (reviewing these duties and drawing lessons for public representation).
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justifiably impose some coercive burdens on a foreign people gener-
ally as necessary to protect the human rights of particularly vulnerable
groups such as political prisoners held in arbitrary detention or mi-
norities subject to racial discrimination.  Both the principle of imparti-
ality and the principle of minority protection reflect the foundational
principle that fiduciaries must treat all beneficiaries as formal moral
equals.
Another principle of fiduciary relationships is that fiduciary
power is purposive, in the sense that it is held or conferred for limited
purposes, such as furthering exclusively the equitable interests of a
trust’s beneficiary.  In the international context, states are permitted
to use countermeasures only to advance the humanity-centric pur-
poses of sovereignty in international legal order: guaranteeing funda-
mental human security under the rule of law.  Proportionality analysis,
in this sense, is not just about minimizing unnecessary interference in
the domestic affairs of a target state but about determining whether
foreign intervention will, in the end, promote or undermine funda-
mental human security under the rule of law within a target state.  For
example, a trade embargo that weakens an autocrat’s appetite for tor-
turing religious dissidents might satisfy the Articles on State Responsibil-
ity’s requirement that countermeasures be “commensurate with the
injury suffered, taking into account the gravity of the internationally
wrongful act and the rights in question.”211  Nonetheless, such inter-
vention will not qualify as “proportional” under the fiduciary theory if
it could be expected to trigger a severe economic crisis or lead to
famine conditions that would endanger human security throughout
the target country.  When multiple states undertake humanitarian
countermeasures, fiduciary principles dictate that they must cooper-
ate with one another to ensure that the aggregated impact of their
measures is proportional under these standards.  Simply put, interven-
ing states may exercise their coercive powers only in a manner that is
consistent with their overarching mission to promote fundamental
human security under the rule of law.  These principles provide
greater definition to proportionality analysis, clarifying how propor-
tionality applies to the unique concerns that arise when states use hu-
manitarian countermeasures.
In sum, under the fiduciary theory, the legal structure of humani-
tarian countermeasures is revealed as having both horizontal and ver-
tical dimensions.  States represent human rights victims abroad for
the purpose of bringing countermeasures against oppressive states.
But their authority to represent foreign peoples is conferred by inter-
national law, and it is governed by general fiduciary principles that
211 CRAWFORD, supra note 6, art. 51. R
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mitigate the agency problems associated with foreign intervention.
Thus, although humanitarian countermeasures constitute a form of
international peer enforcement, these measures are consistent with
the rule of international law to the extent that they are authorized
under customary international law, are governed by robust legal prin-
ciples of fiduciary obligation, and are subject to the possibility of con-
tinuous monitoring and review by the international community as a
whole.212
One advantage of the fiduciary theory’s approach to proportion-
ality is that it offers a fresh vantage point from which to engage the
international community’s disenchantment with “unilateral economic
coercion.”213  Over the past twenty years, international organizations
have joined developing nations in expressing grave reservations about
the use of coercive economic measures such as trade embargos, asset
freezes, and investment restrictions that impede the delivery of food
and medical care and the provision of essential social services.214
Experts have argued, as well, that coercive economic measures tend to
exacerbate economic inequality, encourage public corruption, spawn
black markets, and stoke nationalist sentiments that strengthen the
hand of oppressive regimes.215  The United States’ longstanding “em-
bargo” against Cuba, which includes an asset freeze, travel ban, trade
restrictions, and constraints on new investment, vividly illustrates this
problem.216  Over a half-century after they were first imposed, U.S.
countermeasures have had scant impact in persuading the Cuban gov-
ernment to release political prisoners and take other steps toward full
compliance with international human rights law, but they have signifi-
cantly burdened economic development and have limited Cubans’ ac-
212 See Evan Fox-Decent, Unseating Unilateralism, in PRIVATE LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW
(Lisa Austin & Dennis Klimchuk eds., forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2175588 (arguing that private enforcement may be consistent with the rule of law
when it is subject to legal principles and ex post review).
213 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 66/186, supra note 10, at 2. R
214 See, e.g., Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2004/22, Rep. on its 60th Sess., Mar.
15–Apr. 23, 2004, U.N. Doc. E/2004/23-E/CN.4/2004/127, at 89 (Apr. 16, 2004)
(stressing that “essential goods such as food and medicines should not be used as tools for
political coercion”); World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 1993, Vienna Decla-
ration and Programme of Action, ¶ 31, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (Jul. 12, 1993)
(“[C]all[ing] upon States to refrain from any unilateral measure not in accordance with
international law and the Charter of the United Nations that creates obstacles to trade
relations among States and impedes the full realization of the human rights . . . , in particu-
lar the rights of everyone to . . . food and medical care, housing and the necessary social
services.”).
215 See Sub-Commission Report, supra note 10, at 1, 13–14.
216 See id. at 22; see also AMNESTY INT’L, THE U.S. EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA: ITS IMPACT ON
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 13–19 (2009), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/
library/info/AMR25/007/2009 (discussing the deleterious effects of the United States’
trade restrictions against Cuba).
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cess to effective medical care.217  Small wonder that the U.N. General
Assembly has condemned the United States’ countermeasures against
Cuba every year for the past two decades—most recently by a vote of
188 in favor to 3 against, with 2 abstentions.218  The devastating
humanitarian impact of sweeping collective sanctions against other
states such as Iraq,219 Haiti,220 and Burundi221 during the 1990s have
further fueled skepticism about whether international economic coer-
cion can be reconciled with human rights.  States that contemplate
using coercive economic measures to enforce the human rights of for-
eign peoples must be prepared, therefore, for the criticism that such
measures are “inconsistent with the principles of international law as
set forth in the Charter of the United Nations” because they have a
disproportionately negative impact on human rights, economic devel-
opment, and the exercise of self-determination.222
The fiduciary theory of humanitarian countermeasures is
uniquely responsive to these concerns.  Fiduciary principles of integ-
rity and solicitude would preclude states from imposing or maintain-
ing countermeasures in a manner that would disproportionately
burden human rights.  A state that used countermeasures in this way
could not claim to act in the interests of a foreign people.
217 See Sub-Commission Report, supra note 10, at 22–23; AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 216,
at 13–19.
218 See, e.g., General Assembly Renews Call for End to US Embargo Against Cuba, UN NEWS
CENTRE (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43482&Cr=
cuba (reporting that the U.N. General Assembly adopted the twenty-first resolution calling
for an end to the United States’ “economic, commercial and financial blockade” against
Cuba: “By a vote of 188 in favour to three against (Israel, Palau and the United States) with
two abstentions (Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia), the Assembly
reiterated its call to all States to refrain from promulgating and applying laws and measures
not conforming with their obligations to reaffirm freedom of trade and navigation”); see
also U.N. Secretary-General, Necessity of Ending the Economic, Commercial and Financial Em-
bargo Imposed by the United States Against Cuba, U.N. Doc. A/67/118 (Aug. 16, 2012) (repro-
ducing statements of 145 states and 26 international organizations expressing criticism of
U.S. economic coercion against Cuba).
219 See Sub-Commission Report, supra note 10, at 16–19 (suggesting that at least
500,000 children perished in Iraq as indirect casualties of international economic sanc-
tions); Under-Secretary-General for Admin. & Mgmt., Report to the Secretary-General on Hu-
manitarian Needs in Kuwait and Iraq in the Immediate Post-Crisis Environment, at 5, U.N. Doc.
S/22366 (Mar. 20, 1991) (describing the impact of financial sanctions as “near-
apocalyptic”).
220 See Felicia Swindells, U.N. Sanctions in Haiti: A Contradiction Under Articles 41 and 55
of the U.N. Charter, 20 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1870, 1940 (1996) (observing that unemployment
in Haiti rose to eighty percent during international sanctions).
221 See ERIC HOSKINS & SAMANTHA NUTT, THE HUMANITARIAN IMPACTS OF ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS ON BURUNDI, at xiii, 39 (1997) (observing that economic sanctions limited ac-
cess to vaccines in Burundi, leading to outbreaks of meningitis, typhoid, dysentery, and
cholera).
222 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 66/186, supra note 10, at 2; see also Sub-Commission Report, supra R
note 10, at 4 (noting that economic sanctions “most seriously affect the innocent
population”).
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The fiduciary theory affirms, however, that economic counter-
measures will not always be antithetical to international human rights.
In some settings, humanitarian countermeasures may satisfy the pro-
portionality requirement if they are narrowly “targeted” to maximize
their coercive impact on state decisionmakers while minimizing collat-
eral harm to social and economic human rights generally.  For exam-
ple, a state may freeze the personal bank accounts of foreign regime
leaders who engage in crimes against humanity, as the United States
did against the Qaddafi regime during the 2011 Libyan Revolution.223
Although countermeasures that encroach significantly upon social
and economic human rights throughout a target state will rarely be
proportional under the fiduciary theory, they are more likely to satisfy
proportionality analysis if they respond to correspondingly wide-rang-
ing human rights violations such as apartheid, genocide, or crimes
against humanity.224  As a fiduciary of necessity for human rights hold-
ers, states may use countermeasures in a manner that places some
temporary constraints on the enjoyment of social and economic rights
within a target state, provided that these constraints are consistent
with principles of fiduciary obligation, including the requirement to
respect nonderogable human rights.225  Indeed, the international
community’s turn to targeted economic coercion in the first decade
of the twenty-first century—following the disastrous experiments in
Iraq, Haiti, and Burundi during the 1990s—arguably reflects an en-
hanced appreciation of the special fiduciary obligations associated
with nonforcible humanitarian action.226  The fiduciary theory thus
shows that it is possible to endorse the position of the U.N. High Com-
missioner for Human Rights—that international law permits states to
use countermeasures to protect the human rights of foreign nationals
abroad—while at the same time sharing the view of developing na-
tions that states may not use humanitarian countermeasures in a man-
ner that exacerbates human rights crises.
223 See Evan J. Criddle, Humanitarian Financial Intervention, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 583,
606–07 (2013).
224 See, e.g., TAMS, supra note 2, at 210–25 (discussing coercive measures against, inter R
alia, Liberia, Nigeria, Uganda, and South Africa).
225 See CRAWFORD, supra note 6, at 333–34, art. 50 & cmts. 6–7 (asserting that counter- R
measures “shall not affect . . . obligations for the protection of fundamental human
rights”); see also Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 206, at 347–60 (developing a fiduciary R
theory of jus cogens).
226 See THOMAS J. WATSON JR. INST. FOR INT’L STUDIES, Preface to TARGETED FINANCIAL
SANCTIONS: A MANUAL FOR DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION, at vi (2001) (reporting an interna-
tional consensus among experts on the need for “targeted sanctions” to avoid “excessive
suffering to civilian populations”).
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E. Preconditions for Humanitarian Countermeasures
This brings us to our third question: May states impose countermea-
sures in response to any human rights violations abroad or only a limited sub-
set—for example, massive and systematic abuses, or violations of jus cogens?
As shown in Part I, some legal scholars have argued that all human
rights qualify as obligations erga omnes, while others have argued that
only a limited subset such as jus cogens norms fall within this cate-
gory.227  Some commentators believe that human rights violations
must be massive and systematic, imperiling the lives of large numbers
of people, before they qualify for humanitarian countermeasures.228
Others contend that even isolated human rights violations against in-
dividuals may be sufficient to justify countermeasures.229
The fiduciary theory provides a novel perspective on these de-
bates.  Rather than focus on whether individual states or the interna-
tional community as a whole have a sufficiently “fundamental” interest
in particular human rights norms in the abstract, the fiduciary theory
follows Grotius and Vattel in asking whether a target state has, in ef-
fect, ruptured its bonds of fidelity to its people by treating some of its
nationals as mere objects that it may dominate, instrumentalize, or
destroy at will.230  Only when this threshold has been crossed may
other states assume responsibility for representing oppressed
peoples.231
At first glance, this formulation might appear to authorize states
to use humanitarian countermeasures whenever they determine that a
state has violated the human rights of its nationals, irrespective of the
character of the rights violated.  After all, every human rights violation
arguably represents a rupture in the state-subject fiduciary relation-
ship for those individuals or groups whose rights have been violated.
Deeper reflection suggests, however, that states may use humanitarian
countermeasures to vindicate nonperemptory human rights only
under limited circumstances.
The problem with imposing humanitarian countermeasures in
response to violations of nonperemptory human rights such as free-
dom of expression and association is not that these violations do not
constitute ruptures in the state-fiduciary relationship (they surely do).
Nor is it that other states lack standing to assert claims as fiduciaries of
necessity on behalf of foreign nationals whose nonperemptory human
227 See supra Part I.D.2 and notes 101–02.
228 See infra note 248. R
229 See infra note 251. R
230 See supra Part II.B.
231 States arguably may not use humanitarian countermeasures unless human rights
victims have exhausted alternative avenues for relief that are available within their own
state.
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rights have been violated (they do not).  Rather, the problem is that
human rights treaties clearly entrust each state individually with dis-
cretion to determine how best to respect, protect, and fulfill nonper-
emptory human rights within their borders.  States bear primary
responsibility for deciding whether, or to what extent, a public emer-
gency within their jurisdiction necessitates derogation from their
human rights commitments.232  They are also charged with deciding
whether limitations on certain human rights such as freedom of ex-
pression, freedom of assembly, and freedom of religion are necessary
to protect other compelling interests such as “the fundamental rights
and freedoms of others.”233  This formal allocation of decisional re-
sponsibility to states reflects a presumption, in Benvenisti’s words, that
other states and international institutions lack the “competence to
make better judgment calls than the reviewed sovereigns.”234  It also
reflects a recognition that allowing third parties to override these
context-sensitive judgments could have a disproportionately “stifling
impact” on a people’s exercise of self-determination through “domes-
tic democratic processes.”235  In contrast, states contemplating hu-
manitarian countermeasures lack legal authority to enforce their own
unilateral judgments that another state has exceeded its authority to
derogate from or limit the exercise of nonperemptory human rights.
This does not mean that states may never use countermeasures to
enforce nonperemptory human rights abroad.  Just as private-law fidu-
ciaries such as guardians, trustees, and corporate directors are always
subject to the residual fiduciary supervision of courts, so too states are
subject to the residual fiduciary supervision of regional and interna-
tional tribunals such as the U.N. Human Rights Council, the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, and the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights.  These treaty bodies tend to review state judgments
regarding the need for human rights derogations and limitations with
a heavy measure of deference, recognizing states’ privileged role as
the primary fiduciaries for their own people.236  Yet despite this defer-
ential approach, human rights tribunals often conclude that states
have abused their discretionary power to derogate from their human
rights commitments or to limit the exercise of human rights within
their borders.  Once a tribunal has authoritatively established the vio-
lation of nonperemptory human rights, the fiduciary theory suggests
232 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 142, art. 4. R
233 See, e.g., id. arts. 18, 19, 21, 22.
234 Benvenisti, supra note 186, at 332. R
235 Id.
236 See, e.g., Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 207 (1978) (intro-
ducing the “margin of appreciation” principle).
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that states may intervene as fiduciaries of necessity to impose humani-
tarian countermeasures on behalf of human rights holders abroad.237
In contrast, states need not await the determination of an interna-
tional body before enforcing peremptory human rights such as the
prohibitions against torture and slavery.  Where such norms are con-
cerned, there is no scope under international law for states to contend
that they may derogate from or limit the exercise of human rights
based on national security, self-determination or other important pub-
lic values.  The international community has already determined in
advance that peremptory norms, by definition, are never subject to
derogation or limitation under any circumstances.238  A state that
transgresses peremptory human rights therefore indisputably ruptures
its fiduciary relationship with its people.239  Under such circum-
stances, other states are free to intervene as successor trustees or fidu-
ciaries of necessity on behalf of foreign peoples for the limited
purpose of imposing humanitarian countermeasures.
Denis Alland has questioned whether countermeasures are an ap-
propriate vehicle for enforcing peremptory norms based on the con-
cern that “countermeasures grow in the soil of equivalent and
contradictory assertions.  Admitting here that jus cogens is to be placed
in this interplay of subjective claims and interpretations would mean
denying what characterizes it.”240  In contrast, the fiduciary theory sug-
gests that it is precisely because peremptory norms stand outside the
“interplay of subjective claims and interpretations” that their violation
lays the groundwork for other states to intercede as fiduciaries of ne-
cessity for foreign nationals abroad.241  When a state has manifestly
violated peremptory human rights such as the prohibitions against
torture or slavery, other states may respond with humanitarian coun-
termeasures without awaiting further clarification from an interna-
tional tribunal or authorization from the Security Council.
The United States’ recent coercive measures against Iran and
Syria illustrate how this distinction between peremptory and nonper-
237 Cf. CRAWFORD, supra note 6, art. 52(3)(b) (providing that countermeasures may not R
be taken if “the dispute is pending before a court or tribunal which has the authority to
make decisions binding on the parties”).
238 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 142, arts. 4, 7, 8; Genocide Convention, supra note 70, R
arts. I, IV.
239 See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 206, at 368–70.
240 Alland, supra note 90, at 1237. R
241 Although considerable debate surrounds the legal basis and scope of international
jus cogens, these norms are widely accepted to include, at a minimum, the prohibitions
against genocide; slavery or slave trade; murder or disappearance of individuals; torture or
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged arbitrary deten-
tion; systematic racial discrimination; and “the principles of the United Nations Charter
prohibiting the use of force.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 702, cmts. d–i, § 102, cmt. k (1987).
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emptory norms would apply in practice.242  During the height of the
Arab Spring in April and May 2011, the Obama administration im-
posed asset freezes against Syrian officials after the regime of Presi-
dent Bashar al-Assad began a campaign of “violence and torture
against, and arbitrary arrests and detentions of, peaceful protes-
tors.”243  When these asset freezes failed to stem the tide of violence,
the White House expanded its countermeasures to include additional
prohibitions against new investment in Syria and provisions banning
the purchase, sale, or transportation of Syrian oil.244  Under the fidu-
ciary theory, the United States could lawfully impose such measures
without Security Council authorization on behalf of the Syrian people,
because the Assad regime had unquestionably broken its bonds of mu-
tual fidelity with its people by violating the peremptory prohibitions
against torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, and crimes against
humanity.
In contrast, the fiduciary theory of humanitarian countermea-
sures would not support the United States’ decision a year later to
intensify its countermeasures against both Iran and Syria based on
these states’ efforts to quash political dissent by jamming telecommu-
nications signals and blocking public access to the Internet.245  Al-
though U.S. officials expressed outrage at these constraints on
freedom of expression, the fiduciary theory suggests that the United
States could not reasonably invoke these actions as a basis for sup-
planting the target states as fiduciary representatives for their people.
Unlike the prohibitions against torture, prolonged arbitrary deten-
tion, and crimes against humanity, the human right to freedom of
expression is not a peremptory norm; it is one from which states are
permitted to derogate during public emergencies.246  As no authorita-
242 See Peter Baker, U.S. Sets New Sanctions Against Technology for Syria and Iran, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2012, at A8; Steven L. Myers & Anthony Shadid, U.S. Imposes Sanctions on
Syrian Leader and 6 Aides, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2011, at A10.
243 Exec. Order No. 13,572, Blocking Property of Certain Persons with Respect to
Human Rights Abuses in Syria, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,787, pmbl. (Apr. 29, 2011); see also Exec.
Order No. 13,573, Blocking Property of Senior Officials of the Government of Syria, 76
Fed. Reg. 29,143, 29,143–44 (May 18, 2011).
244 See Exec. Order No. 13,582, Blocking Property of the Government of Syria and
Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to Syria, 76 Fed. Reg. 52,209, 52,209 (Aug.
18, 2011).
245 See Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-
158, §§ 401–415, 126 Stat. 1214 (2012) (expanding U.S. sanctions related to human rights
abuses in Iran); Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-239,
§ 1243(b)(3)–(4), 126 Stat. 1632 (2012) (imposing countermeasures to “help the people
of Iran produce, access, and share information freely and safely via the Internet and
through other media; and . . . defeat all attempts by the Government of Iran to jam or
otherwise obstruct international satellite broadcast signals”).
246 ICCPR, supra note 142, art. 4(1).  Even under the United States’ domestic law, the R
scope of state authority to block access to communications signals remains deeply contro-
versial. See, e.g., Terry Collins, BART Cell Phone Shutdown: Safety Issue or Free Speech Violation?,
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tive international body had found Iran and Syria to have violated the
international human right to freedom of expression by temporarily
disrupting communications technologies within their borders, the
United States could not reasonably intercede to enforce its own inde-
pendent assessment of the situation.247
On the other hand, the fiduciary theory does not require human
rights violations to be “massive” or “widespread” to justify countermea-
sures, as some commentators have suggested.248  Whenever a state vio-
lates peremptory norms on any scale—even if it subjects a single
individual to torture or prolonged arbitrary detention—it effectively
forfeits its claim to serve as a fiduciary for the affected human rights
holder, laying the groundwork for other states to use humanitarian
countermeasures.  For example, an oppressive state that singles out a
political opposition leader such as an Aung San Suu Kyi249 or a Nelson
Mandela250 for prolonged arbitrary detention or cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment cannot evade international accountability based
on the argument that its actions do not involve “widespread” or “sys-
tematic” harm to human rights.  The violation of a peremptory norm
would provide an adequate legal basis for other states to pierce the
veil of sovereignty and assume responsibility for the welfare of a victim
of human rights abuse.  To be sure, the proportionality principle dic-
tates that intervening states would bear a heightened burden to use
narrowly targeted countermeasures when a target state engages in
only isolated violations of peremptory human rights.  Nonetheless, the
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 15, 2011, 1:48 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/
15/bart-cell-phone-shutdown-free-speech_n_927294.html (discussing public debates over
whether the state may shut down Internet access in the interest of public safety).
247 To be sure, even in the absence of an official pronouncement from an authorized
international institution, the suppression of expressive freedoms might justify humanita-
rian countermeasures when such practices are enforced through jus cogens violations such
as summary execution, prolonged arbitrary detention, torture, or forced disappearance.
See, e.g., Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act § 1243(b)(1) (emphasizing the U.S.
government’s intent to “deny the Government of Iran the ability to continue to oppress
the people of Iran and to use violence and executions against pro-democracy protestors
and regime opponents”).  Nonetheless, the United States could not justifiably rely upon
censorship of cell phone and Internet communications alone as a basis for imposing or
expanding humanitarian countermeasures against Iran and Syria. See id. § 1243(b)(3)–
(4).
248 See Jochen A. Frowein, Reactions by Not Directly Affected States to Breaches of Public Inter-
national Law, 248 RECUEIL DE COURS 345, 400 (1994); Stefan Kadelbach, Jus Cogens, Obliga-
tions Erga Omnes and Other Rules—The Identification of Fundamental Norms, in THE
FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: JUS COGENS AND OBLIGATIONS
ERGA OMNES  21, 25–26 (Christian Tomuschat & Jean-Marc Thouvenin eds., 2006).
249 See Hannah Beech, The First Lady of Freedom, TIME, Jan. 10, 2011, at 30 (discussing
the house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi, the elected president of Burma, between 1989 and
2010).
250 See Nelson Mandela & Richard Stengel, Long Walk to Freedom, TIME, Nov. 28, 1994, at
52 (discussing Nelson Mandela’s twenty-seven-year imprisonment on South Africa’s
Robben Island).
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limited scale of the abuses perpetrated by an oppressive state would
not itself preclude other states from using countermeasures to protect
human rights abroad.
In sum, the fiduciary theory clarifies the scope of state authority
in several critical respects.  First, it supports the conclusion that hu-
manitarian countermeasures are permissible in response to the viola-
tion of peremptory norms of general international law.251  Second,
states may also use countermeasures to enforce nonperemptory
human rights when the violation of these norms has been confirmed
by an authorized tribunal.  Third, the fiduciary theory challenges the
notion that human rights violations must surpass a certain scale of
harm or cross some artificial threshold of “importance” to the interna-
tional community as a whole before states may employ humanitarian
countermeasures.  The distinction between permissible and impermis-
sible peer enforcement is thus cast into sharper relief by the fiduciary
theory.
F. Fiduciary Representation and the Principle of
Self-Determination
Critics might object that the fiduciary theory revives the paternal-
istic rhetoric that colonial powers employed for centuries to rational-
ize their exploitation of first nations.252  Grotius’s guardianship
analogy can be justly criticized for infantilizing a state’s subjects, treat-
ing them as mere passive objects of state concern rather than as self-
determining agents whose views are entitled to consideration and re-
spect.253  Given that humanitarian countermeasures are rarely subject
to meaningful review in any international tribunal, there is a serious
risk that foreign “guardians” may exploit controversies abroad for
their own purposes, pursuing idiosyncratic political agendas in the
name of “universal” rights.254  In an era when the self-determination
of peoples has become a cornerstone of international legal order, the
idea that humanitarian countermeasures generate a fiduciary relation-
ship between intervening states and foreign peoples might therefore
251 See CRAWFORD, supra note 6, art. 40, cmt. 2; TAMS, supra note 2, at 151. R
252 See WILLIAMS, supra note 169, at 97–107; Criddle, supra note 169, at 408–09. R
253 See Lauterpacht, supra note 160, at 14 (characterizing ON THE LAW OF WAR AND R
PEACE as a “servile and reactionary instrument [for the] justification of established
authority”).
254 Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Fifth Rep. on State Responsibility, Int’l Law
Comm’n, 40 ¶ 156, UN Doc. A/CN.4/453 & Adds. 1–3 (June 24, 1993) (by Gaetano
Arangio-Ruiz); see also Linda Alcoff, The Problem of Speaking for Others, 20 CULTURAL CRI-
TIQUE 5, 7 (1991) (noting that “the practice of privileged persons speaking for or on behalf
of less privileged persons has actually resulted (in many cases) in increasing or reinforcing
the oppression of the group spoken for”).
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appear on first impression to represent a counterintuitive and per-
haps even regressive move.255
Such concerns seem to have caused the ILC to overlook the fidu-
ciary character of humanitarian countermeasures.  In comments lead-
ing up to the final Articles on State Responsibility, Crawford argued that
the “great difficulties” involved “in securing legitimate representation
[of] human groups or individuals . . . in the absence of a valid expres-
sion of the wishes of the victim or victims” would counsel against bas-
ing humanitarian countermeasures on a theory of foreign interest
representation.256  Instead, Crawford insisted that: “States may be
properly concerned as to the issues of international legality, without
necessarily identifying with the victims or seeking to represent
them.”257
Properly understood, the fiduciary theory is preferable to
Crawford’s account because it provides a legal framework for recon-
ciling foreign intervention with the principle of self-determination.
Much of the resistance that fiduciary conceptions of foreign interven-
tion encounter can be traced to the troubling legacy of colonial
“guardianship,” a governance model that enabled Western states to
rationalize paternalistic policies in flagrant disregard of indigenous
self-determination.258  The disastrous legacy of international sanctions
and countermeasures against Iraq, Haiti, Burundi, and Cuba under-
score the dangers of employing a “civilizing” guardianship model or
Burkean trusteeship model that would allow intervening states to im-
pose their own conceptions of the good without regard to the views of
the oppressed people they purport to serve.  But legal guardianship is
not the only fiduciary model for humanitarian countermeasures; pri-
vate law offers a variety of alternative models in which fiduciaries are
obligated to respect the decision-making authority of their benefi-
ciaries.  For example, in agent-principal, lawyer-client, and doctor-
patient relationships, fiduciaries perform services on behalf of their
beneficiaries, but they also bear obligations to consult, deliberate
with, and respect their beneficiaries’ preferences.259  Unlike guardi-
255 See RICHARD FALK, HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 2 (1981) (“The historical
record of so-called humanitarian intervention bears out [a] skeptical response to those
governments who currently proclaim themselves the global guardians of human rights.”).
256 Third Crawford Report, supra note 85, at 8 ¶ 378. R
257 Id.
258 See Criddle, supra note 169, at 407, 420–21. R
259 See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990) (ob-
serving that doctors bear a fiduciary duty to disclose facts necessary to obtain the informed
consent of their patients); 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01, cmt. f(1) (2006) (“An
essential element of agency is the principal’s right to control the agent’s actions.”); Carol
A. Needham, Advance Consent to Aggregate Settlements: Reflections on Attorneys’ Fiduciary Obliga-
tions and Professional Responsibility Duties, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 511, 514 (2012) (observing
that a lawyer’s duty of loyalty includes obligations to “communicate effectively with the
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ans who serve incompetent wards, fiduciaries in agent-principal, law-
yer-client, and doctor-patient relationships are not entitled to
substitute their own assessment of the best interests of their benefi-
ciaries for their beneficiaries’ actual preferences; instead, they are en-
trusted with legal authority to enable beneficiaries to advance their
own preferences more effectively.  If beneficiaries in one of these rela-
tionships are dissatisfied with their representative, they are entitled to
opt out.  These fiduciary relationships, which seek to maximize benefi-
ciaries’ capacity for self-determination, provide a better model for hu-
manitarian countermeasures than Grotius’s guardianship analogy.
When states use countermeasures in a manner that is appropriately
solicitous of the actual values and desires of foreign peoples, foreign
intervention may facilitate the effective self-determination and eman-
cipation of oppressed peoples.
Recent developments in the international law of indigenous
rights illustrate how the fiduciary model can be deployed to enhance
the self-determination of foreign peoples.  Rather than treat indige-
nous peoples as incompetent subjects of state guardianship, the U.N.
General Assembly’s Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
provides that states must “consult and cooperate in good faith
with . . . indigenous peoples . . . through their own representative
institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent
before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative mea-
sures that may affect them.”260  Similar requirements of good faith
consultation and consent-based action now feature in the jurispru-
dence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights261 and in the
client regarding the representation, and consult with the client regarding the matters es-
sential to the representation” (citation omitted)); cf. Ethan J. Leib & David L. Ponet, Fiduci-
ary Representation and Deliberative Engagement with Children, 20 J. POL. PHIL. 178, 188–92
(2012) (arguing that public fiduciaries bear robust obligations for inclusive public
deliberation).
260 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples art. 19, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007); cf. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples in Independent Countries arts. 5–6, June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382 (providing that
states must honor “the social, cultural, religious and spiritual values and practices of [indig-
enous] peoples”; “consult the peoples concerned . . . whenever consideration is being
given to . . . measures which may affect them directly”; and conduct these consultations “in
good faith and in a form appropriate to the circumstances, with the objective of achieving
agreement or consent to the proposed measures”).
261 See, e.g., Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, at 5 (June 27, 2012) (“The Court establishes that one
of the fundamental guarantees to ensure the participation of the indigenous people and
communities in the decisions relating to measures that affect their rights . . . is the recogni-
tion of their right to consultation, which is particularly recognized in ILO Convention No.
169, among other  complementary international instruments.”); Case of the Saramaka Peo-
ple v. Suriname, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 133 (Nov. 28, 2007)
(“[T]he Court has stated that in ensuring the effective participation of members of the
Saramaka people in development or investment plans within their territory, the State has a
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decisions of municipal courts in a number of jurisdictions.262  Collec-
tively, these developments suggest that a state’s fiduciary relationship
with indigenous peoples entails a duty to treat indigenous peoples as
self-determining agents whose preferences are entitled to respect.263
By the same token, when states impose humanitarian counter-
measures on behalf of foreign peoples abroad, they bear a similar fi-
duciary duty to consider foreign values and preferences in good faith.
Respect for local values does not mean that violations of peremptory
norms such as slavery, genocide, or torture may be excused on
grounds of cultural relativism and national self-determination.
Rather, it means that states contemplating humanitarian countermea-
sures must consider whether the particular coercive measures they
adopt in response to human rights violations (e.g., trade embargoes,
asset freezes, or travel bans) are appropriately sensitive to local values
and concerns.  Where possible, intervening states should also consult
in good faith with oppressed groups and individual victims of human
rights abuse and seek consensus on the best approach for restoring
human rights observance within a target state.264  On the one hand,
the fiduciary principle of minority protection may justify humanita-
rian countermeasures for the benefit of an oppressed group in some
settings even if a majority of the population approves of the group’s
oppression.  On the other hand, when representatives for an op-
pressed group request the easing or elimination of humanitarian
countermeasures undertaken on their behalf, intervening states
should make every effort to respect these requests.265
duty to actively consult with said community according to their customs and traditions.”
(citation omitted)).
262 See, e.g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942); Haida Nation
v. B.C. (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, 513 (Can.); R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R.
1075, 1077 (Can.); N.Z. Maori Council v. Att’y Gen., [1987] 1 NZLR 641 (HC) (N.Z.).
263 See generally Evan Fox-Decent & Ian Dahlman, Sovereignty as Trusteeship and Indige-
nous Peoples, 16 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW (forthcoming 2015), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=2516141.
264 Cf. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 260, art. 32 (“States R
shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through
their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent
prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories . . . .”); Saramaka
People, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶¶ 131–37 (emphasizing the need for good
faith consultation with indigenous peoples and, for large-scale projects, informed con-
sent); Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries art. 19(b), Rep. of the
Int’l Law Comm’n, 58th Sess., May 1–June 9, July 3–Aug. 11, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/61/10;
GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2006) (recommending that states asserting diplomatic
protection claims “[t]ake into account, wherever feasible, the views of injured persons with
regard to resort to diplomatic protection and the reparation to be sought”).
265 See, e.g., Anne Gearan, Aung San Suu Kyi Urges Easing of U.S. Sanctions on Burma,
WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-09-19/world/3549
6923_1_suu-kyi-burma-burmese-government (discussing the Burmese opposition leader’s
request for the easing of sanctions because “their usefulness has run its course”). But see
David Mepham, Burma: The EU Has Been Too Quick to Lift Sanctions, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 23,
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Far from undermining self-determination, therefore, the fiduci-
ary theory advances respect for self-determination by enhancing inter-
national attention to the needs and preferences of foreign peoples.
This is not to deny Crawford’s observation that foreign representation
raises significant legitimacy concerns “in the absence of a valid expres-
sion of the wishes of the victim or victims.”266  The best response to
these concerns, however, is not simply to turn a blind eye to the
agency problems associated with humanitarian countermeasures by
artificially recharacterizing human rights as state rights or community
rights.  Instead, the international community should embrace the rep-
resentational character of humanitarian countermeasures and insist
that states consult with and, where possible, obtain informed consent
from their foreign beneficiaries to ensure that humanitarian counter-
measures respect the values and interests of human rights holders
abroad.  When such deliberative engagement is not practicable, fidu-
ciary law offers principled safeguards in the form of fiduciary duties to
practice integrity, solicitude, impartiality, and minority protection,
while seeking to advance fundamental human security under the rule
of law.  Some might protest that foreign representation without
informed consent smacks of neocolonialism,267 but this critique has
less force when grave human rights abuse are imminent and engaged
deliberation is impossible.  In these settings, the fiduciary obligations
associated with humanitarian countermeasures mediate the relation-
ship between an intervening state and its foreign beneficiaries to cate-
gorically prohibit the kinds of domination that are associated with
neocolonialism.
Of course, the fiduciary theory of humanitarian countermeasures
raises a host of challenging questions for the future development of
international law.  For example, how should the international commu-
nity enforce the fiduciary duties of intervening states?  In the private-
law realm, fiduciary duties lay the groundwork for ex post judicial re-
view of fiduciary performance, holding out the threat of disgorgement
and other potent remedies.268  Formal enforcement in the interna-
tional realm is far more diffuse, consisting of a patchwork system of
reports and resolutions from international institutions such as the
2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/apr/23/burma-eu-too-quick-lift-
sanctions (observing that despite some progress, human rights violations continue in some
regions of Burma, including crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing).
266 Third Crawford Report, supra note 85, at 8 ¶ 378. R
267 Cf. Seth Davis, The False Promise of Fiduciary Government, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1145, 1198 (2014) (raising concerns about whether a fiduciary model of government can
be implemented successfully in practice).
268 See Miller, supra note 137, at 572 (“[B]oth the duty of loyalty and disgorgement as a
remedy for disloyalty may be understood as vindicating the exclusive claim beneficiaries
hold over fiduciary power as a means derived from their legal personality or that of their
benefactors.”).
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U.N. General Assembly, the U.N. Secretary-General, and the U.N.
Human Rights Council.  As the longstanding stalemate between the
United States and the international community over Cuba demon-
strates, these supranational review mechanisms are inadequate to
ensure that powerful states will always use humanitarian countermea-
sures in a manner that comports with their fiduciary obligations.269
In an ideal world, a more fully developed international regime
for enforcing the fiduciary duties of intervening states might provide
for judicial review or some other robust institutional check on abusive
intervention at the international level.  Until such international insti-
tutions take shape, however, the international community will have to
make due with decentralized solutions.  Here the customary law of
humanitarian countermeasures itself offers a useful template.  As this
Article has shown, humanitarian countermeasures can be understood
as a second-best solution for a nonideal world in which international
institutions such as the Security Council are unable or unwilling to
protect international human rights in many parts of the globe.  Just as
the international community has used decentralized tools such as hu-
manitarian countermeasures to enforce states’ human rights obliga-
tions to their own people, such tools may also play an important role
in the enforcement of intervening states’ fiduciary obligations to for-
eign nationals abroad.270
G. Reframing Humanitarian Countermeasures
Most legal scholars today accept the ICJ’s assertion that at least
some international human rights qualify as obligations erga omnes.
The fiduciary theory, in contrast, suggests that this characterization is
deeply misleading.  States owe human rights obligations to human
rights holders, not states individually or collectively.  While all interna-
tional human rights are matters of legitimate concern to the interna-
tional community, this does not mean that states may claim an
independent legal entitlement to human rights compliance abroad, as
Barcelona Traction suggests.271  Human rights obligations are not owed
to states, even if it is the case that some human rights—namely, per-
emptory norms—are enforceable by all states because international law
entrusts states to bring humanitarian countermeasures on behalf of
269 See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 216, at 13–19 (noting that “[f]or the past 14 years, R
the UN Secretary-General has documented the negative impact of the US embargo on
Cuba”); General Assembly Renews Call for End to US Embargo Against Cuba, supra note 218 R
(noting that the current prohibitions prevent Cuba from thriving).
270 Although this Article will not undertake to specify the full features of an effective
regime for enforcing intervening states’ fiduciary obligations to foreign peoples, it lays the
groundwork for such a regime by clarifying the nature and scope of states’ authority to use
humanitarian countermeasures.
271 Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 ¶¶ 33–34.
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human rights holders abroad.272  These observations reveal the need
for more nuanced understanding of the diverse ways in which interna-
tional norms may claim universal applicability.
To be sure, some international norms are universal in the sense
contemplated in Barcelona Traction, because all states are entitled to
claim a legal injury whenever any state violates these norms anywhere.
These norms prohibit conduct that injures all states.  For example, the
prohibitions against massive pollution of the atmosphere and oceans
extend to all states (erga omnes) because they protect common re-
sources in which all states have an independent legal interest.273  In-
ternational norms that safeguard international peace and security
such as the prohibition against aggression arguably have an erga omnes
structure as well, because they prevent hostilities that could erupt into
global conflicts that may adversely impact all states.274  Such obliga-
tions are properly characterized as obligations erga omnes because they
protect the legal interests of all states.
Not all international norms that have universal applicability qual-
ify as obligations erga omnes in this sense.275  International human
rights have a universal scope not because states owe these obligations
to all other states, but rather because all states are bound by these obli-
gations.276  The principle of self-determination operates similarly.
272 To the extent that particular human rights treaties authorize states to initiate en-
forcement proceedings based on human rights violations abroad (e.g., American Conven-
tion, supra note 80, art. 61; European Convention, supra note 80, art. 24; Genocide R
Convention, supra note 70, art. IX), these instruments do not transform human rights into R
state rights.  Rather, these instruments authorize state parties to initiate enforcement pro-
ceedings as fiduciary representatives for human rights holders.
273 See Delbru¨ck, supra note 90, at 26–27 (“The ratio legis is that the common interest in R
protecting the ozone layer [and other central features of the global environment] . . . is so
overwhelming that no State may be permitted not to comply with the protective regimes
regardless of whether or not it has consented to the creation of the regime[s].”).
274 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 104 ¶ 196 (June 27) (Schwebel, J., dissenting) (citing article 27 of the Char-
ter of the Organization of American States for the proposition that “[e]very act of aggres-
sion by a State against the territorial integrity or the inviolability of the territory or against
the sovereignty or political independence of an American State shall be considered an act
of aggression against the other American States”); Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 32 ¶ 34
(asserting that some obligations erga omnes “derive . . . , in contemporary international law,
from the outlawing of acts of aggression”).
275 See Bruno Simma, Does the UN Charter Provide an Adequate Legal Basis for Individual or
Collective Responses to Violations of Obligations Erga Omnes?, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT: NEW SCENARIOS – NEW LAW? 125, 134 (Jost Delbru¨ck ed., 1992)
(distinguishing obligations “whose violation directly and materially ‘injures’ another or
certain other states in the more or less traditional, tangible mode, like the prohibition of
aggression or of large-scale international damage to the environment (as in the case of the
burning of the Kuwaiti oil fields by Iraq),” from human rights obligations and other norms
that do not injure particular states).
276 Human rights that qualify as jus cogens such as the prohibitions against slavery, ge-
nocide, and torture are universal in other respects as well, because states must comply with
these norms at all times, in all places, and with respect to all persons.
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Under the U.N. Charter and customary international law, all states
bear an obligation to respect the “principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples.”277  But contrary to the ICJ’s assertion in
the Palestinian Wall case, states owe this obligation to peoples of the
world (including their own), not to other states per se.278  Human
rights and the principle of self-determination are analytically distinct
from traditional obligations erga omnes because they “do not protect
states but rather human beings or groups directly.”279  When interna-
tional law authorizes states to enforce these obligations against other
states, they may do so only as fiduciary representatives for the individ-
uals and groups who hold these rights under international law.  The
better reading of Barcelona Traction, therefore, is that customary inter-
national law authorizes all states, acting as fiduciary representatives, to
call an oppressive state to account for its human rights violations
against its own people.
The international community has little to lose, and a great deal to
gain, by setting aside the idea that human rights are obligations erga
omnes in favor of the fiduciary conception of humanitarian counter-
measures.  The fiduciary theory affirms the core message of previous
theories that states are “entitled to uphold some [international legal
obligations] even though the particular contravention . . . has not af-
fected their own material interests.”280  But it offers a superior ac-
count of the juridical structure of humanitarian countermeasures:
states derive their standing to enforce the human rights of foreign
peoples from the fiduciary character of their representative role.
Those who have endorsed the state-interest theory in the past should
welcome the fiduciary theory, because it offers a sound account of the
relationship between human beings’ primary legal interests in human
rights observance and states’ secondary (derivative) legal interests in
the enforcement of human rights abroad, strengthening the argu-
ment that states may assert authority ut singuli to protect the human
rights of foreign nationals.281 Proponents of the community-interest
theory should also welcome the fiduciary theory because it affirms the
fundamental importance of human rights to international public or-
der while circumventing the “apparent paradox” of “unilateral collec-
tive action.”282  In addition, the fiduciary theory offers principled
277 U.N. Charter art. 1(2); see also East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 102 ¶ 29
(June 30) (asserting that “the right of peoples to self-determination . . . has an erga omnes
character”).
278 See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 199 ¶ 155 (July 9).
279 Simma, supra note 275, at 134. R
280 BROWNLIE, supra note 74, at 470. R
281 Fourth Crawford Report, supra note 115. R
282 Id. at 18–19 ¶ 76.
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criteria for distinguishing which human rights violations are enforcea-
ble through humanitarian countermeasures.  And unlike the state-
interest and community-interest theories, the fiduciary theory is
uniquely responsive to developing states’ concerns that coercive eco-
nomic measures must respect the human rights and self-determina-
tion of peoples within target states.  At a time when debates over
“unilateral coercive measures” continue to divide the international
community, the fiduciary theory of humanitarian countermeasures of-
fers a roadmap for finding new common ground.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have argued that states derive their standing to
contest human rights violations abroad from the principle that they
stand for human rights holders.  Contrary to the ICJ’s assertion in
Barcelona Traction, international human rights are not state rights, nor
are they rights of the international community as a whole.  Interna-
tional human rights are precisely what they purport to be: legal rights
that international law vests in human beings tout court.  In appropriate
cases, all states may represent human rights victims beyond their bor-
ders for the purpose of bringing countermeasures on behalf of those
foreign nationals.  But this authority to represent foreign nationals
abroad is entrusted to states in a fiduciary capacity, and states that
employ humanitarian countermeasures bear fiduciary obligations to
pursue the interests of foreign nationals rather than their own na-
tional interests.  This fiduciary conception of foreign intervention,
which earned the endorsement of early publicists such as Vitoria,
Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel, provides a sound foundation for the
international law of humanitarian countermeasures today.
Viewed through a wider lens, the fiduciary theory developed in
this Article forges a link between the law of humanitarian counter-
measures and other regimes that govern foreign intervention, includ-
ing the U.N. trusteeship system and the law of belligerent occupation.
In each of these regimes, international law authorizes states to exer-
cise public powers abroad as a “sacred trust” for the purpose of guar-
anteeing fundamental human security under the rule of law for
oppressed peoples who are unable to obtain effective representation
from their own state.283  International law thus ties the exercise of
283 League of Nations Covenant art. 22.  As such, fiduciary principles may also furnish
a template for other forms of decentralized international law enforcement that find sup-
port in customary international law but fall outside the scope of this Article, including the
use of countermeasures to combat public corruption abroad. See, e.g., Freezing Assets of
Corrupt Foreign Officials (Tunisia and Egypt) Regulations, SOR/2011-78 (Can.) (estab-
lishing that internal turmoil and corruption in Tunisia and Egypt warrant the use of coun-
termeasures by Canada); Exec. Order No. 13,566, Blocking and Prohibiting Certain
Transactions Related to Libya, 76 Fed. Reg. 11,315, 11,315–16 (Feb. 25, 2011) (establishing
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public powers to fiduciary obligations, which prohibit intervening
states from exploiting their power over a foreign people for their own
gain.  Whenever states enforce the legal interests of foreign nationals
abroad, they must use their coercive powers solely for the benefit of
their designated beneficiaries and in a manner that respects the prin-
ciple of self-determination.
that violence against unarmed civilians in Libya warrants the use of countermeasures by
the United States); Exec. Order No. 13,469, Blocking Property of Additional Persons Un-
dermining Democratic Processes or Institutions in Zimbabwe, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,841,
43,841–42 (July 25, 2008) (establishing that public corruption and human rights abuses in
Zimbabwe warrant the use of countermeasures by the United States); Richard Spencer &
Nick Meo, Hosni Mubarak Resigns: Switzerland to Freeze Assets of Ousted Ruler, TELEGRAPH (Feb.
11, 2011), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindian
ocean/egypt/8319821/Hosni-Mubarak-resigns-Switzerland-to-freeze-assets-of-ousted-ruler
.html (establishing that corruption and instability in Egypt warrant the use of humanita-
rian countermeasures by Switzerland).
